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Abstract 
This study examines the pluralistic hypothesis advanced by the late Professor John Hick viz. 
that all religious faiths provide equally salvific pathways to God, irrespective of their 
theological and doctrinal differences.  The central focus of the study is a critical examination 
of (a) the epistemology of religious experience as advanced by Professor Hick, (b) the 
ontological status of the being he understands to be God, and further asks (c) to what 
extent can the pluralistic view of religious experience be harmonised with the experience 
with which the Christian life is understood to begin viz. regeneration. 
Tracing the theological journey of Professor Hick from fundamentalist Christian to religious 
pluralist, the study notes the reasons given for Hick’s gradual disengagement from the 
Christian faith.  In addition to his belief that the pre-scientific worldview of the Bible was 
obsolete and passé, Hick took the view that modern biblical scholarship could not 
accommodate traditionally held Christian beliefs. He conceded that the Incarnation, if true, 
would be decisive evidence for the uniqueness of Christianity, but rejected the same on the 
grounds of logical incoherence. This study affirms the view that the doctrine of the 
Incarnation occupies a place of crucial importance within world religion, but rejects the 
claim of incoherence. 
Professor Hick believed that God’s Spirit was at work in all religions, producing a common 
religious experience, or spiritual awakening to God. The soteriological dimension of this 
spiritual awakening, he suggests, finds expression as the worshipper turns away from self-
centredness to the giving of themselves to God and others. At the level of epistemology he 
further argued that religious experience itself provided the rational basis for belief in God.   
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The study supports the assertion by Professor Hick that religious experience itself ought to 
be trusted as a source of knowledge and this on the principle of credulity, which states that 
a person’s claim to perceive or experience something is prima facie justified, unless there 
are compelling reasons to the contrary. Hick’s argument has been extensively developed 
and defended by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and William Alston. This confirms the 
importance of Hick’s contribution to the philosophy of religion, and further establishes his 
reputation within the field as an original thinker. 
It is recognised in this thesis, however, that in affirming only the rationality of belief, but not 
the obligation to believe, Professor Hick’s epistemology is not fully consistent with a 
Christian theology of revelation. Christian theology views the created order as pre-
interpreted and unambiguous in its testimony to God’s existence. To disbelieve in God’s 
existence is to violate one’s epistemic duty by suppressing the truth. 
Professor Hick’s critical realist principle, which he regards as the key to understanding what 
is happening in the different forms of religious experience, is examined within this thesis. 
According to the critical realist principle, there are realities external to us, yet we are never 
aware of them as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us within our particular 
cognitive machinery and conceptual resources. All awareness of God is interpreted through 
the lens of pre-existing, culturally relative religious forms, which in turn explains the 
differing theologies within the world of religion. The critical realist principle views God as 
unknowable, in the sense that his inner nature is beyond the reach of human conceptual 
categories and linguistic systems. Professor Hick thus endorses and develops the view of 
God as ineffable, but employs the term transcategorial when speaking of God’s ineffability. 
4 
 
The study takes the view that the notion of transcategoriality as developed by Professor 
Hick appears to deny any ontological status to God, effectively arguing him out of existence. 
Furthermore, in attributing the notion of transcategoriality to God, Professor Hick would 
appear to render incoherent his own fundamental assertion that we can know nothing of 
God that is either true or false. 
The claim that the experience of regeneration with which the Christian life begins can be 
classed as a mere species of the genus common throughout all faiths, is rejected within this 
thesis.  Instead it is argued that Christian regeneration is a distinctive experience that 
cannot be reduced to a salvific experience, defined merely as an awareness of, or 
awakening to, God, followed by a turning away from self to others. 
Professor Hick argued against any notion that the Christian community was the social 
grouping through which God’s Spirit was working in an exclusively redemptive manner. He 
supported his view by drawing attention to (a) the presence, at times, of comparable or 
higher levels of morality in world religion, when contrasted with that evidenced by the 
followers of Christ, and (b) the presence, at times, of demonstrably lower levels of morality 
in the followers of Christ, when contrasted with the lives of other religious devotees.  
These observations are fully supported, but the conclusion reached is rejected, on the 
grounds that according to Christian theology the saving work of God’s Spirit is evidenced in 
a life that is changing from what it was before. Christian theology does not suggest or 
demand that such lives at every stage be demonstrably superior, when contrasted with 
other virtuous or morally upright members of society. 
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The study concludes by paying tribute to the contribution Professor Hick has made to the 
field of the epistemology of religious experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 2 
 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 8 
 
Chapter 1: John Hick’s Spiritual and Theological Journey to Religious Pluralism .............. 9 
   1.1     Introduction... ......................................................................................................... 9 
   1.2     Early Christian Influences ..................................................................................... 11 
   1.3     Disengagement from Fundamentalist Christianity .............................................. 16 
   1.4     Philosopher of Religion ........................................................................................ 17 
   1.5     The Structure of Faith ........................................................................................... 19 
   1.6     Theological Controversy ....................................................................................... 25 
   1.7     A Christian Theodicy ............................................................................................. 25 
   1.8     Inter-Faith Dialogue ............................................................................................. 26 
   1.9     A Copernican Shift in Theology ............................................................................ 28 
   1.10   The Myth of God Incarnate .................................................................................. 36 
   1.11   An Interpretation of Religion ............................................................................... 41 
   1.12   Later Years ............................................................................................................ 45 
 
Chapter 2: Epistemology of Religious Experience ............................................................ 48 
   2.1     The Problem of Definition .................................................................................... 48 
   2.2     The Rationality of Religious Belief ........................................................................ 55 
   2.3     Rejection of Foundationalism............................................................................... 57 
   2.4     Mystical Experience as Cognition ......................................................................... 63 
   2.5     Epistemological Structure ..................................................................................... 68 
   2.6     The Critical Realist Principle ................................................................................. 71 
 
Chapter 3: Who or What is God? ...................................................................................... 74 
   3.1     God as Ineffable .................................................................................................... 74 
   3.2     God as Transcendent ............................................................................................ 78 
   3.3     God as Incomprehensible ..................................................................................... 81 
   3.4     The Essence of God ............................................................................................... 82 
   3.5     Laws of Logic ......................................................................................................... 95 
   3.6     The Logos Doctrine ............................................................................................. 107 
 
Chapter 4: God’s Self-Disclosure..................................................................................... 119 
   4.1     Biblical General Revelation ................................................................................. 119 
   4.2     Pluralistic General Revelation ............................................................................. 124 
 
Chapter 5: God’s Universal Influence ............................................................................. 129 
   5.1     God’s Spirit at Work in All Religions? ................................................................. 129 
   5.2     Comparable Levels of Morality ........................................................................... 129 
   5.3     Demonstrably Low levels of Morality ................................................................. 132 
   5.4     The Presence of a Common Religious Experience ............................................. 137 
7 
 
 
Chapter 6: The Distinctive Character of Christian Regeneration.................................... 144 
   6.1     Regeneration Defined ......................................................................................... 144 
   6.2     Regeneration and Religious Experience ............................................................. 147 
   6.3     Regeneration and the Spirit of God .................................................................... 151 
   6.4     Regeneration and the Principle of Credulity ...................................................... 158 
   6.5     The Relationship of the Spirit to the World System ........................................... 161 
 
Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................... 164 
   7.1     The Corpus of Hick’s Writings ............................................................................. 164 
   7.2     Hick’s Defence of the Pluralistic Hypothesis ...................................................... 164 
   7.3     Hick’s Engagement with Christian Theology ...................................................... 165 
   7.4     Hick’s Contribution to Religious Epistemology................................................... 168 
   7.5     Hick’s Critique of Christian History ..................................................................... 168 
 
 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to say a huge thanks to my lovely wife Alison, without whose inspiration and 
encouragement this thesis would never have seen the light of day. Alison is one of life’s 
great encouragers, who constantly sacrifices and promotes the happiness and wellbeing of 
everyone else around her. Arriving home on dark winter nights, after long hours of teaching, 
she would think nothing of sitting at the laptop to check the spelling and grammar of the 
thesis before cheerfully exhorting me to press on to the next section.  
It would also be remiss of me not to extend my thanks to Professor Donald Macleod of 
Edinburgh Theological Seminary. Donald showed great patience as huge chunks of time 
would pass with no communication from me. Whenever anything did arrive on his desk, it 
was usually before edits, without prior notice, in the form of solid blocks of paragraph with 
few or no headings and with possibly the least number of commas per page than any 
manuscript ever written. All Donald’s comments were very scholarly and apt, and made me 
wish that he had himself written so much more than the many books he has penned thus 
far. 
Finally, I wish to say how touching it was to be constantly encouraged by the Free Church of 
Scotland fellowship in Govan. Many of our folk have no formal qualifications whatsoever, 
and have few positive memories of school.  Yet each person seemed to take great delight in, 
and derive some pride from, the fact that having come from Govan myself, I was pursuing 
these studies.  
 
9 
 
Chapter 1:  John Hick’s Spiritual and Theological Journey to Religious Pluralism 
1.1 Introduction 
Writing during the last quarter of the twentieth century Harvard historian Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith asserted: 
The time will soon be with us when a theologian who attempts to work out his 
position unaware that he does so as a member of a world society in which other 
theologians equally intelligent, equally devout , equally moral, are Hindus, Buddhists, 
Muslims, and unaware that his readers are likely to be Buddhists or to have Muslim 
husbands or Hindu colleagues-such a theologian is as out of date as one who 
attempts, to construct an intellectual position unaware that Aristotle has thought 
about the world or that existentialists have raised new orientations or unaware that 
the earth is a minor planet in a galaxy that is vast only by terrestrial standards. 
Philosophy and science have impinged so far on theological thought more effectively 
than has comparative religion, but this will not last.1 
 The question of the relationship of Christianity to the non-Christian religions has indeed 
become and remains a major point of theological and philosophical debate. It is within this 
debate that theologian and philosopher John Hick has established his reputation as an 
                                                          
1
 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “The Christian in a Religiously Plural World,” in Willard Oxtoby, ed., Religious 
Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 9. 
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innovative thinker and first- rate scholar. Indeed Christopher Sinkinson has written 
concerning Hick: 
No academic study of the Christian response to religious diversity is complete 
without interaction with his work; and no academic religious studies course has truly 
equipped its students unless they are familiar with his arguments.2 
Similarly Victoria S. Harrison comments: 
Hick is probably the most innovative and influential twentieth-century philosopher 
of religion, having concentrated on the issues raised by the conflicting claims of the 
various world religions.3 
What perhaps adds to the considerable interest shown in the work of Hick is that his 
standing as one of the most influential philosophers of religion of his day was resultant upon 
a personal religious, moral, and spiritual pilgrimage from Christian exclusivism to a form of 
global religious pluralism.  
Perhaps at the outset it might be helpful to outline the core claims of John Hick’s 
interpretation of religious plurality. Keith E. Yandell4 summarises it in the following way: 
1. Each religion asks generically the same question: how do we get from our present 
lack to a better future? 
                                                          
2
 Christopher Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths: A Critical Study of John Hick’s Religious Pluralism, 2. 
3
 Victoria S. Harrison, Religion and Modern Thought, 209. 
4
 Keith E. Yandell, Philosphy of Religion, 67-68 
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2. Each world religion is a response to the same thing. 
3. Each world religion has its own phenomenal reality. 
4. Since each world religion has its own phenomenal reality, the claims of one world 
religion do not conflict with those of another world religion. 
5. Responding to this phenomenal reality is so far as we can tell, equally effective in 
each world religion.  
6. Each world religion is equally valid. 
7. The sentences that apparently express the doctrines of the great world religions 
actually are mythological in the sense of telling story which elicits behaviour.  
8. The mythology is true if the behaviour is good. 
9. The reason for accepting religious pluralism is that it is the best explanation for 
central facts about religious plurality. 
 
1.2 Early Christian Influences 
John Harwood Hick was born on 20th January 1922 in Scarborough Yorkshire. Christopher 
Sinkinson’s critical examination of Hick’s life and work published in 2001 suggests that in his 
childhood years Hick had little or no concern with religious matters. He writes: 
12 
 
His childhood was not marked by any great interest in religion as he found the parish 
church his family attended as a matter of infinite boredom.5 
However, in his autobiography published in 2002 Hick indeed testifies to a sense of serious 
enquiry on religious matters from a young age and this was wedded to a keen philosophical 
cast of mind.  Indeed, an awareness of a sense of deity seemed to possess him from his 
earliest days.  He writes: 
Although the church had nothing directly to do with it I have from as early as I can 
remember had a rather strong sense of the reality of God as the personal and loving 
lord of the universe and of life as having a meaning within God’s purpose.6 
His mother was actively involved in spiritualism 7 while his grandmother enjoyed a keen 
interest in the British Israelite movement. George Jeffreys, founder in 1926 of the Four 
Square Gospel Alliance (the forerunner to the Elim Pentecostal Church), was often a guest at 
the Hick household. Hick recalls that at twelve years of age, upon visiting the family, 
Jeffreys: 
… laid his hands on my head and I immediately felt a strong physical effect, like an 
electric shock except that it was not a sharp bolt but a pervasive sensation spreading 
                                                          
5
 Christopher Sinkinson, The Universe of Faiths: A Critical Study of John Hick’s Religious Pluralism, 2. 
6
 John Hick, God Has Many Names, 14. 
7
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 28. 
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down through my body. I was in floods of tears; not of sadness or fright but I 
suppose a tremendous emotional impact.8 
As a young adult Hick was introduced to the Theosophy movement and of this period of his 
life he writes: 
I was attracted by theosophy as the first coherent religious philosophy that I had met 
– much more so than the Christianity I knew.9 
Throughout this time Hick was also an avid reader of philosophy. At sixteen he was reading 
Plato, Descartes, Locke, Berkley, Hume and Kant. Even at this stage of young adulthood 
some of his of philosophical reflections seem remarkably consistent with the position he 
was to arrive at later in his academic career, when he would speak of God being “trans-
categorial.” The following is taken from a collection of recorded aphorisms produced when 
Hick was eighteen years of age: 
Reality is ethical and consists of God who cannot be regarded as finite or infinite, or 
as having any or no form, or by any other analogy from the physical universe, but 
can only be comprehended “mystically”, by reason of the divine spark in each of us.10 
                                                          
8
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 27. 
9
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 27. 
10
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 32. 
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It was at University College, Hull, where he was studying law that Hick seemed to progress 
beyond a general spiritual search to a particular experiential and doctrinal fulfilment of the 
same.  He records: 
As a law student at University College, Hull, at the age of 18 I underwent a powerful 
evangelical conversion under the impact of the New Testament figure of Jesus. For 
several days I was in a state of intense mental and emotional turmoil, during which I 
became increasingly aware of a higher and greater reality pressing in upon me and 
claiming my recognition and response. At first this was highly unwelcome; a 
disturbing and challenging demand for nothing less than a revolution in personal 
identity. But then the disturbing claim became a liberating invitation. The reality that 
was pressing in upon me was not only awesomely demanding but also irresistibly 
attractive and I entered with great joy and excitement into the world of Christian 
faith.11 
He adds: 
I accepted as a whole and without question the entire fundamentalist theological 
package – the verbal inspiration of the Bible; creation and fall; Jesus as God the Son 
incarnate, born of a virgin, conscious of his divine nature and performing of divine 
power, redemption by his blood from sin and guilt; Jesus’ bodily resurrection, 
ascension and future return in glory and heaven and hell.12 
                                                          
11
 John Hick, An  Autobiography, 33. 
12
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 34. 
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At this point Hick would have been quite at ease with the traditional and conservative view 
of the historical accuracy of The New Testament, represented in the following three 
statements:  
There is no body of ancient literature in the world which enjoys such a wealth of 
good textual attestation as the New Testament.13 
The evidence for our New Testament writings is ever so much greater than the 
evidence for many writings of classical writers, the authenticity of which no one 
dreams of questioning. And if the New Testament were a collection of secular 
writings their authenticity would generally be regarded as beyond all doubt.14 
And again:   
We generally assume people are telling the truth unless we have good reasons to 
think otherwise. There is simply no reason for refusing to apply this assumption to 
ancient people as well. Indeed, as we discussed in the last chapter, if historians were 
not willing to apply this common courtesy to ancient authors, most of our 
information about ancient history would be disqualified. If, for example historians 
assumed that accounts in the writings of ancient historians such as Josephus, 
Suetonius, Tacitus, or Livy could not be trusted until each account could be 
                                                          
13
 F. F. Bruce, The Books and the Parchments, 78. 
14
 F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable?, 15. 
16 
 
individually proven trustworthy, we would have concluded that we know next to 
nothing about Greco-Roman times!15 
As a result of this life-changing experience Hick decided automatically to switch from legal 
studies to train for the Christian ministry within the Presbyterian Church of England. With 
this goal in mind he enrolled at the University of Edinburgh intending to pursue an Arts 
degree before going on to study theology. Having enrolled at Edinburgh University for the 
academic year 1941-42 Hick’s studies were interrupted by the war. For 3 years he served in 
The First Ambulance Unit as a conscientious objector. He did not graduate until 1948 but did 
so as an outstanding student. His achievement of a first class honours degree was enhanced 
further by the senior philosophy medal, and the Vans Dunlop Scholarship. Hick declined the 
latter in favour of the Campbell-Frazer scholarship to Oriel College Oxford thus enabling him 
to pursue further studies in philosophy. 
 
1.3 Disengagement from Fundamentalist Christianity 
The time in Edinburgh was significant in respect of two issues. First, Hick progressively 
disentangled himself from the Evangelical Union of Students with whom he had so much in 
common during the first year of his studies. This parting of the ways according to Hick was 
resultant upon his willingness to entertain doubts about the credibility of certain core 
                                                          
15
 Gregory Boyd, Jesus Under Siege, 98-109. 
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fundamentalist and doctrinal beliefs including the judicial aspect of Christian eschatology. 
He writes:  
And could it be an expression of infinite love to sentence the large majority of the 
human race to eternal torment in hell?16 
By the time Hick was writing his fourth book Christianity at the Centre published in 1968 not 
only had he jettisoned many core traditional Christian doctrines but understood that 
continued adherence to such would result in the marginalisation or perhaps the extinction 
of the church in a scientific age. He writes: 
The question today is whether such beliefs are of the permanent essence of 
Christianity; or whether they belong to the history of its interaction with the pre-
scientific culture which has only recently come to an end. If the former, Christianity 
is doomed to the role of a fading superstition. But if the latter these mythical 
concepts can be properly left behind as Christianity advances into a new culture of 
modern science.17 
 
1.4 Philosopher of Religion 
The second significant development connected to his Edinburgh years was his growing 
appreciation of the work of Immanuel Kant in general and in particular Kant’s 
                                                          
16
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 70. 
17
 John Hick, Christianity at the Centre, 9. 
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noumenal/phenomenal distinction, which Hick was eventually to employ as an 
epistemological tool in his pluralistic philosophy. 
Indeed, such was Hick’s admiration of Kant at this point that he writes: 
I agree with Bryan Magee when he says that ‘I hold the greatest single achievement 
in the history of philosophy to be Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal. ’18 
Having secured the Campbell-Frazer scholarship, Hick proceeded to Oriel College Oxford 
where, under the supervision of H.H. Price, he completed his PhD. The area of Hick’s 
research lay in the philosophy of religion, within which he sought to examine the 
epistemology of religious belief, or the relationship between faith and knowledge.  
 From 1953 to 1956 Hick served as a Christian minister in Belford Presbyterian Church, 
having studied for the Ministry at Westminster College Cambridge from 1951 to 1953. 
Westminster seemed to add very little to Hick’s intellectual development other than the 
conviction that he had no appetite or aptitude for biblical languages.  Neither at this stage 
did he have any interest in other religions apart from Christianity. However, he did attend 
lectures at Cambridge University delivered by John Wisdom and C.D. Broad from which Hick 
derived some benefit.  Speaking of Wisdom’s idiosyncratic style of lecturing Hick recalls: 
His lectures were completely unstructured and unprepared and one listened, bored 
stiff to his meanderings until every few weeks he said something so arresting and 
                                                          
18
 John Hick, An  Autobiography, 68. 
19 
 
thought provoking that one came back for more. One such sentence which I have 
treasured ever since was that doing metaphysics is like finding a pattern in a puzzle 
picture. This was a brilliant use of Wittgenstein’s discussion of seeing-as, and was for 
me a clue to the nature of religious experience and religious faith.19 
In 1954 Cornell University approached Hick inviting him to apply for a job as an assistant 
professor to teach philosophy of religion. In January 1956 after 3 years in Belford, Hick 
travelled to the USA and so began his academic career. Cornell had a strong philosophy 
department with a keen interest in promoting the earlier and later work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.  Additionally, Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr visited the university.   
 
1.5 The Structure of Faith 
During his time in Cornell, stretching from 1956-1959, Hick further developed the theme of 
his earlier doctoral dissertation. The finished product was a book entitled Faith and 
Knowledge published in 1957 by Cornell University Press. Insofar as Cornell was a member 
of the Ivy League fraternal of educational institutions, this publishing of his work was a solid 
endorsement of Hick’s potential as philosopher of religion. The book went through various 
revisions, editions and printings over a period of 31 years. However, his only other 
publication of note at this time was an article in the Scottish Journal of Theology20criticising 
                                                          
19
 John Hick, An Autobiography, 81. 
20
John Hick, The Christology of D. M. Baillie. 
20 
 
the Christology of Donald Baillie, whose work Hick at this time regarded as a step in the 
wrong direction, insofar as it was a serious departure from Chalcedon orthodoxy. 
Faith and Knowledge is an important work in the corpus of Hick’s writings for the simple 
reason that despite his prodigious literary output throughout his academic career his 
epistemology was to remain largely consistent with that which he espoused in this his first 
book. 
Hick rejects what he calls the scholastic conception of faith, in which faith is understood to 
be a response to certain propositions set forth in the Bible. This concept of faith he replaces 
by a faith rooted in one’s actual experience of God. Hick suggests that two elements are 
present in his own understanding of faith:  firstly, that which he takes to be the basic 
characteristic of human experience, i.e. ’significance’, which he defines in the following way: 
By significance I mean that fundamental and all pervasive characteristic of our 
conscious experience which de facto constitutes for us the experience of a "world" 
and not of a mere empty void or churning chaos. We find ourselves in a relatively 
stable and ordered environment in which we have come to feel, so to say, "at 
home." The world has become intelligible to us, in the sense that it is a familiar place 
in which we have learned to act and react in appropriate ways. Our experience is not 
just an unpredictable kaleidoscope of which we are bewildered spectators, but 
reveals to us a familiar, settled cosmos in which we live and act, a world in which we 
can adopt purposes and adapt means to ends. It is in virtue of this homely, familiar, 
intelligible character of experience—its possession of significance—that we are able 
to inhabit and cope with our environment. If this use of "significance" be allowed it 
21 
 
will, I think, readily be granted that our consciousness is essentially consciousness of 
significance.21 
Secondly, he introduces the notion of the experience of ‘interpretation’, which Hick 
understands to be the correlative mental activity by which the significance is apprehended. 
Religious interpretation is thus a perception of significance rather than an inference from or 
to certain propositions. As Hick further explains: 
The primary religious perception, or basic act of religious interpretation, is not to be 
described as either a reasoned conclusion or an unreasoned hunch that there is a 
God. It is, putatively, an apprehension of the divine presence within the believer’s 
human experience. It is not an inference to a general truth, but a “divine-human 
encounter,” a mediated meeting with the living God. 22 
In other words, the believer apprehends God as a living reality but this apprehension of the 
divine is not independent of, neither does it exist in isolation from, all other factors that 
make up his life’s experience.  This apprehension of God is one that meets him in and 
through the totality of his experience and not one that circumvents or compartmentalises 
his experience of reality. One becomes vividly conscious of the presence and activity of the 
divine being because this is how the totality of our experience is being interpreted to us. 
                                                          
21
John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 98. 
22
John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 115. 
22 
 
Knowing God, therefore, according to Hick, is not any different in its epistemological 
structure than that of how we come to the knowledge of other things.  According to Hick, 
the difference between knowing at a religious level and other forms of knowledge is not one 
of kind but of the level of reality known.  All knowledge according to Hick follows and 
conforms to the same epistemological structure i.e. all knowledge is the human 
interpretation of objective realities.   Thus he writes: 
We shall find that interpretation takes place in relation to each of the three main 
types of existence… the natural, the human and the divine; and that in order to 
relate ourselves appropriately to each, a primary and unevidenceable act of 
interpretation is required which, when directed toward God, has traditionally been 
termed “faith.” Thus I shall try to show that while the object of religious knowledge 
is unique, its basic epistemological pattern is that of all our knowing.23 
At this point it may be helpful to establish that Hick is saying something different from, but 
similar to, the traditional Christian teaching on the doctrine of General Revelation.  What 
Hick is arguing for is not the presence of a universal and pre-interpreted revelation equally 
available to all mankind which provides testimony to God’s existence.  Such a view 
presupposes a universe that is unambiguous while serving as an instrument of revelation to 
confirm the existence of God. Hick is speaking of a universe that can be both interpreted 
and experienced in various ways just as differing patterns and shapes can be detected in 
puzzle pictures. Thus for the theist the natural world is one that for him is infused with the 
                                                          
23
John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 96-97. 
23 
 
sense of divine presence. However, for the naturalist the same universe is not one that 
functions as a catalyst for any divine transcendent experience.  Thus both the religious and 
non- religious person would be rational and therefore within their epistemic rights to hold 
contrary interpretations of reality although ultimately one may be false and the other true. 
He writes: 
The universe as envisaged by the theist, then, differs as a totality from the universe 
as envisaged by the atheist. However, from our present standpoint within the 
universe, this difference does not involve a difference in the objective content of 
each or even of its passing moments. The theist and the atheist do not (or need not) 
expect different events to occur in successive details of the temporal process.24 
And again: 
Yet our human existence itself, considered apart from the interpretative responses 
of the human mind remains ambiguous and equally capable of being ‘experienced 
as’ in a religious or in a naturalist manner.25 
As to the provision of a principle of verification according to which one belief may be 
confirmed or disconfirmed Hick proposes the experience of an eschatological verification or 
post-mortem encounter with God.26 
                                                          
24
 John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 105. 
25
 John Hick, Christianity at the Centre, 54. 
26
 John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 177-78. 
24 
 
The question naturally arises as to why God should choose to make his presence known in 
such an indirect and uncertain way, and not through some powerful and irrefutable 
manifestation of his majesty, power and glory? Hick locates the answer in the nature of 
loving relationships. In order for a loving relationship to be authentic the element of free 
choice, and not coercion, must be present.  Thus he writes: 
The process of becoming aware of God, if not to destroy the frail autonomy of the 
human personality must involve the individual’s own freely responding insight and 
assent. Within this sphere God is self-discovered in ways that allow us the fateful 
freedom to recognise or fail to recognise God’s presence. Divine activity always 
leaves room for the awareness of God that preserves our cognitive freedom in 
relation to an infinitely greater and superior reality.27 
In 1959 Hick was appointed Professor of Christian Philosophy at Princeton University. In 
some ways the appointment seemed strange, because Hick took the view that while it was 
possible to be a Christian philosopher, there was no actual system of Christian philosophy as 
such.  It was at this stage Hick produced his book published by Prentice Hall entitled 
Philosophy of Religion.  This was part of a new series of short books on all aspects of 
philosophy, written by various recognised authorities in differing fields.  Despite writing the 
book in a very short period of time, Hick’s work was very well received. The publication 
went through various reprints, and was also translated into a number of different languages. 
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1.6 Theological Controversy 
Despite his growing reputation as an innovative thinker, Hick’s time at Princeton was 
dogged by theological controversy.  In short, his adherence to certain doctrines contained in 
the 1647 Westminster Confession of Faith was called into question. The issue was resolved 
in favour of Hick by the Presbytery of New Brunswick, on the grounds that latitude was 
extended to those whose integrity could not allow them to affirm all the teachings of the 
Westminster Confession. The Presbytery decision to receive Hick as a member resulted in a 
letter of complaint being drafted to the New Jersey Synod by those who objected to the 
Presbytery’s affirmation of Hick.  Much to the surprise of the majority of the Presbytery, this 
complaint was upheld and his membership of the Presbytery rescinded. What added some 
urgency to the situation was that failure to secure a seat on the Presbytery would 
automatically strip Hick of his professorship at Princeton. Another counter complaint was 
then addressed to the 1962 General Assembly in support of Hick, which was eventually 
upheld and his position was secure.  
 
1.7 A Christian Theodicy 
In 1963-64 Hick received a Guggenheim Fellowship that enabled him to engage with the 
topic of the problem of evil. This combined with a half year sabbatical from Princeton 
allowed him to carry out research at Cambridge University. It was at this time he produced 
his second major work entitled Evil and the God of Love.  The book has been reprinted many 
times and is widely regarded as Hick’s best work.  Hick sets forth a Christian theodicy 
structured around the thought of Irenaeus, but quite distinct from what he understands as 
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the Augustinian theodicy predicated upon an acceptance of an orthodox reading of the early 
chapters of Genesis.  He writes: 
The traditional solution (representing the theological in distinction from the 
philosophical side of Augustine’s thought on the theodicy problem) finds the origin 
of evil, as we have seen, in the fall, which was the beginning both of sin and as its 
punishment, of man’s sorrows and suffering.  But this theory so simple and 
mythologically satisfying is open to insuperable scientific, moral, and logical 
objections.28 
Towards the end of the sabbatical year a University lectureship at Cambridge became 
vacant.  This brought to an end Hick’s tenure at Princeton. The initial appointment at 
Cambridge was for 3 years. Ordinarily, this would have been followed by a tenure 
appointment until retirement at 67. However in 1967 the H.G. Wood chair of theology at 
Birmingham University became vacant and Hick secured the Professorship.  
 
1.8 Inter-Faith Dialogue 
The particular attraction of this appointment was that it offered Hick the opportunity to 
pursue his primary interest in philosophy of religion with greater freedom than had been 
possible up until this point in his academic career. It was also the beginning of a new phase 
in his thinking, as he found himself drawn increasingly into inter-faith dialogue with 
                                                          
28
 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 285. 
27 
 
adherents of other world religions, whose life seemed to exemplify or mirror the qualities 
that were present in the lives of Christians.  
This he writes concerning Buddhism: 
It is incumbent upon the Christian theologian to explain how a religion that is from a 
theistic point of view so totally wrong can have fruits in human life that are certainly 
not inferior to Christianity’s.29 
And again:  
Few have faced more than superficially the issues raised by the fact that Christianity 
is only one of the great world faiths, and does not seem, when viewed throughout 
history and around the world, to be spiritually, intellectually or morally superior to 
all other religious traditions, as, however, its theology implicitly claims. And so the 
theologian whose head is not buried in the ecclesiastical sand has either to make a 
convincing case for Christianity’s superiority or prepare to rethink those of its 
dogmas which misleadingly imply such superiority.30 
Hick supported these assertions by identifying what he rightly regarded as clear examples of 
a religion seemingly bankrupt of moral standards consistent with its ethical claims. For 
example, speaking of his travels in the USA he writes: 
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From Claremont I travelled all over the States to give lectures and take part in 
conferences. A few trips were into the Deep South where the American Civil War 
was still called by some the War of Northern Aggression. One such was to a College 
in Mobile Alabama. Whilst there I went on Sunday to the large Southern Baptist 
church which was famously photographed in the 1960’s with the deacons standing in 
a row at the door to keep blacks out. 31 
During a visit to South Africa Hick records: 
The largest white church, the Dutch Reformed, supported apartheid and defended it 
on Biblical grounds. Most of the English speaking church leaders opposed apartheid 
but did not have the support of their laity… the evangelical/charismatic movement 
with the Anglican Church enabled people to shut the whole situation out of their 
minds.32 
 
1.9 A Copernican Shift in Theology 
The task of engaging with this question and other related issues saw the publication of a 
collection of essays by Hick in 1972 entitled God and the Universe of Faiths. Several of its 
chapters provide an exposition of Hick’s shifting convictions towards religious pluralism.  
Three of the chapters (8, 9, and 10) were originally delivered in 1972 as a series of public 
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lectures in Birmingham, under the titles of ‘The Essence of Christianity’, ‘The Copernican 
Revolution in Theology’ and ‘The New Map of The Universe of Faiths’. Chapter 7,‘The 
Reconstruction of Christian Belief’, was originally two articles published in 1970. All of these 
chapters form an early, but coherent, argument for Hick’s emerging pluralist hypothesis. 
The catalyst for this radical new departure in Hick’s thinking was his own experience of and 
engagement with other religious faiths in Birmingham.  Realising that the cultic practices 
and doctrinal formulations set each belief system apart, he sought to explore the possibility 
that at the experiential level all devotees were engaging in the same transcendent dynamic 
or religious quest.  
An initial introduction to Hick’s thought on the issue finds expression in the chapter entitled 
‘The Reconstruction of Christian Belief’33 where he suggests that the concept of religions as 
distinct and bounded historical phenomena with mutually exclusive systems of belief is an 
artificial and socially determined construction. In other words, the institutions, doctrines, 
codes of behaviour, and identity markers that mark out one religion from another did not 
arise because the spirituality of any given religion required this. The differentiating of one 
system from the other was resultant on the human but essentially western tendency to 
erect beliefs and practices that safeguard the group’s identity. In this he is following the 
thought of Wilfred Cantwell Smith as unpacked in his book, The Meaning and End of 
Religion34 
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In keeping with Cantwell Smith Hick proposes that the historical development of religion 
should be viewed as a dynamic continuum within which new movements are simply great 
creative and spiritual disturbances which impact upon the stream of religious consciousness 
and in doing so add to our existing knowledge of God. Insofar as we can no longer speak of 
truth and falsity with regard to world faiths certain implications follow. First, the subject 
matter included in the study of theology must now comprise all religious movements that 
feed into this stream of religious consciousness. Secondly, the new task of theological study 
is to sift through these differing but complimentary faiths in order to identify whatever 
universal spiritual and transcendent experience is common to all and this with a view to the 
formation of a global theology. 
Hick’s essay ‘The Essence of Christianity’ builds upon this reinterpretation of the historical 
development of religion in attempting to clarify that which is most important to the 
Christian community. In identifying this it will provide him with a point of comparison with 
which to compare the essence of other world faiths.  Hick at this point differentiates that 
which is unique to the Christian faith, from that which is most important to the Christian. He 
identifies that which is most important to the Christian community as being of the essence 
of faith. The essence of Christianity, he suggests, is not to be found in the confessional 
liturgy of orthodox belief, but in the relational and attitudinal praxis of the Christian 
community, as it is inspired towards a particular code of social conduct by the person of 
Jesus. 
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Recognising that it may seem rather odd not to identify the divine nature of Jesus as being 
of the essence of faith, Hick responds by locating this claim to deity, not in the words of 
Jesus himself, but rather in the response of the later Church to Jesus. Thus he writes: 
It is extremely unlikely that Jesus thought of himself or that his first disciples thought 
of him as God incarnate.35 
The problem faced by Hick at this point was that he still wished to say something about 
Jesus as an historical figure.  He does, after all, tell us quite a bit about Jesus as a religious 
and saintly figure who was vividly conscious of, and close to, God. Presumably this 
testimony is drawn from the gospel records or, at least, those portions of the gospel 
records, which he takes to be authentic.  In other words, Hick has to concede some 
biographical details, or minimal core of sayings about Jesus, that place him in this light as a 
religious leader.  However, the difficulty he encounters is that in so doing he is confronted 
with the fact that everything significant that is disclosed in word or deed about Jesus as a 
religious person seems infused with a high Christology.  
The ubiquitous presence of a high Christology in any grouping of approved sayings 
attributed to Jesus is highlighted by R. Douglas Geivett and W. Garry Philips.  Commenting 
upon the work of Royce Gruenler they write: 
Norman Perrin, a Bultmanian scholar, who applied form-critical methods and the so-
called criterion of dissimilarity to an analysis of the Gospels, produced a 
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compendium of Jesus’ teachings that may confidently be considered authentic. 
Evangelical scholar Royce Gruenler has patiently examined each item countenanced 
by Perrin, paying particular attention to the way Jesus’ self-concept is disclosed by 
his words and deeds. His conclusion is that the Christology implicit in the approved 
core of sayings is indistinguishable from the high Christology of the more explicit 
sayings attributed to Jesus throughout the Gospels and repudiated by radical 
critics.36 
Within Hick’s conceptual scheme Jesus was a simply a man deeply aware of the presence of 
God in his life, and it is this phenomenon that set him apart from others while conferring 
upon him an aura not dissimilar to that which was present in other great religious leaders 
such as Buddha. He writes: 
What seems to have happened during the hundred years or so following Jesus death 
was that the language of divine sonship floated loose from the original ground of 
Jewish thought and developed a new meaning as it took root again in Greco-Roman 
culture.37 
In other words, the primitive response to Jesus was progressively expanded and clothed 
with conceptual categories already residing in the cultural, religious and intellectual milieu 
of the world into which the church carried the message about Jesus.  Thus, by implication, if 
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Christianity at this stage had expanded eastward, the portrait of Jesus would have reflected 
religious thought-patterns already present in that eastern culture. 
He explains: 
If for example it had moved very early into India in which Buddhism was then 
becoming a powerful influence and the Mahayana doctrines were being developed, 
it is likely that instead of Jesus being identified as the divine Logos or divine Son he 
would have been identified as a Bodhisattva who like Gotama some four centuries 
earlier had attained to Buddhahood or perfect relationship to reality but had in 
compassion for suffering mankind voluntarily lived out his human life in order to 
show others the way of salvation.38 
Hick’s next essay entitled ‘The Copernican Revolution in Theology’, which forms chapter 9 in 
God and the Universe of Faiths, is essentially a continuance of his previous argument 
outworked in relation to other world faiths.  Much of the essay is taken up with Hick’s 
rebuttal of any form of inclusivism or exclusivism.  Traditional exclusivism, which has been 
the historic position of the Church, Hick rejects on the grounds that it entails a moral 
contradiction. He writes: 
Can we then accept the conclusion that the God of love who seeks to save all 
mankind has nevertheless ordained that men must be saved in such a way that only 
a small minority can in fact receive this salvation?  It is the weight of this moral 
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contradiction that has driven Christian thinkers in modern times to explore other 
ways of understanding the human religious situation.39 
This rejection of traditional exclusivism is followed by his attempt to dismantle the softer 
position of some Christian theologians, according to which devotees of other faiths are 
understood to be saved by the merits of Christ’s death, although not themselves aware of 
any such arrangement.  This inclusivism sought to distinguish the ontological necessity of 
Christ’s atoning work, and the epistemological necessity of actually hearing about and 
responding to this in a cognitive manner. Various arguments have been adduced in favour of 
this position, not the least of which is an analogy drawn from the argument that the Church 
has always allowed for God’s grace to be extended to certain categories of people for whom 
a cognitive response was not possible prior to, or at the time of, their death.  
Thus we read in the Westminster Confession: 
Elect infants dying in infancy are regenerated and saved by Christ through the spirit 
who worketh when and where and how he pleaseth. So also are all other elect 
persons who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word.40 
The extent to which an analogy can be legitimately drawn from those who are cognitively 
incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word, to those who are 
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circumstantially located beyond the reach of the gospel, is of no concern to Hick. He rejects 
any inclusivism as a sort of half-way house which still retains the vestiges of a western 
imperialism in theology. Just as there was a Copernican revolution in man’s thinking about 
the universe and the position of the earth in relation to it, the theological need of the day 
was a similar paradigm shift in our understanding of world religion that repositioned God at 
the centre, with the universe of faiths revolving around him. Thus he writes: 
Now the Copernican revolution in astronomy consisted in a transformation in the 
way in which men understood the universe and their own location within it. It 
involved a shift from the dogma that the earth is at the centre of the revolving 
universe to the realisation that it is the sun that is at the centre with all the planets, 
including our own earth, moving around it. And the needed Copernican revolution in 
theology involves an equally radical transformation in our conception of the universe 
of faiths and the place of our religion within it. It involves a shift from the dogma 
that Christianity is at the centre to the realization that it is God who is at the centre 
and that all the religions of mankind including our own serve and revolve around 
him.41 
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1.10 The Myth of God Incarnate 
However innovative Hick’s emerging theology was, it was clear that the historic confession 
and teaching of the Church with regard to the Incarnation of Jesus as the Christ could not be 
accommodated within his Copernican shift: 
I came fairly soon to see that for Christianity the problem of religious plurality hinged 
on the central doctrine of the incarnation. If Jesus was God incarnate, Christianity 
alone among the world religions was founded by God in person and must therefore 
be uniquely superior to all others. This made me look again at the traditional 
doctrine and its history.42 
Hick conceived the idea of a book of essays that would represent the emerging consensus 
among certain scholars and theologians that the Incarnation was not to be understood as an 
historical fact. Indeed, Jesus himself, according to such contemporary thought, did not 
actually teach the incarnation but, like other doctrines of the Christian faith, the deification 
of Jesus of Nazareth was resultant upon the teaching of the Church as she was influenced by 
Greek philosophy and Near Eastern mythology.  Thus in 1977 the collection of essays was 
published under the title The Myth of God Incarnate. The book sold around 30,000 copies in 
the first month, creating something of a media circus as various camps within the church 
responded to the book’s central thesis. 
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The publication itself is divided into 2 sections. The first section incorporates a series of 
essays structured around the question of sources relating to the incarnation, while the 
second section sets forth the contributors’ views on how the doctrine of the Incarnation 
developed within the believing community. Hick’s contribution to the work is found in the 
second section of the book and is entitled ‘Jesus and the World Religions’.43 
Hick’s first objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation is an historical one. According to Hick 
the traditional understanding was not taught by Jesus, but was resultant upon the later 
teaching of the Church.  Indeed the part played by the Christian community in the 
development of the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation was, according to Hick, paralleled 
in the way followers of Gautama in the Mahayana tradition progressively exalted the 
Buddha to divine status.  The founder of Buddhism was a real historical figure living in north-
east India from about 563-483 BC.  At some point the human figure of Gautama was taken 
to be the incarnation of a transcendent and pre-existent Buddha or the truth made flesh.  
This development, according to Hick, simply reflected the religious impulse of the spiritual 
community to express their adoration of the movement’s founder in the most exalted terms 
that the host culture had to offer. This dynamic, Hick understands, is paralleled in the way in 
which Jesus, the unknown man of Nazareth, is through the influence of the Christian 
community progressively exalted to the status of the logos becoming flesh. Should someone 
identify the resurrection of Jesus as that which distinguishes Christ from Buddha, Hick meets 
this objection with the following rebuttal: 
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We cannot ascertain today in what this resurrection-event consisted. The 
possibilities range from the resuscitation of Jesus’ corpse to visions of the Lord in 
resplendent glory. But it must be doubted whether the resurrection-event – 
whatever its nature – was seen by Jesus’ contemporaries as guaranteeing his 
divinity.44 
Hick raises a second problem with the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation. His focus at 
this point moves from the historical development under the influence of the Church to what 
he takes to be the doctrine’s incoherence. In other words he suggests that the formulation 
of the doctrine does not admit of any non-metaphorical meaning and is therefore devoid of 
any rational content. He writes: 
Orthodoxy insisted upon the two natures human and divine co-inhering in the one 
historical Jesus Christ. But orthodoxy has never been able to give this idea any 
content. It remains a form of words without assignable meaning. For to say without 
explanation that the historical Jesus of Nazareth was also God is as devoid of 
meaning as to say that a circle drawn with a pencil on paper is also a square. Such 
locution has to be given semantic content: and in the case of the language of 
incarnation all content thus far suggested has had to be repudiated. The 
Chalcedonian formula in which the attempt rested merely reiterated that Jesus was 
both God and man but made no attempt to interpret the formula.45 
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The controversy generated by Hick’s denial of the Incarnation as historical fact, tended to 
obscure the validity of his request for clarity concerning the actual language of the 
Incarnation. As a representative of the analytical school of philosophy it was only natural 
that Hick should seek clarity and explanation with regard to the meaning of the words set 
forth in the Chalcedonian prescription.  The view that the formulation as articulated was 
difficult to comprehend, found support in philosophers who in all other respects were 
theologically orthodox.  Responding to Hick’s assertion that the language used by the early 
church lacks meaningful content, we find Gordon Clark writing: 
The Council assembled in 451 to determine the issue, only half succeeded. With fair 
clarity it managed to decide what the Incarnation was not, but came nowhere near 
defining what the Incarnation was. The Creed’s positive terminology was and 
remains either ambiguous or meaningless.46 
However, Hick’s contention went further than a request for clarity. From his square circle 
analogy it would appear that his fundamental question is, whether the concept of humanity 
and divinity with their essential properties are mutually exclusive, and if so, how can they be 
predicated of the same person? Jesus could be either truly man or truly God, but certainly 
not both. This, according to Hick, involved a metaphysical impossibility, and could not 
therefore be true. In the light of what Hick understands to be the doctrine’s incoherence, he 
suggests that it is more reasonable to adopt a view of the Incarnation according to which it 
is mythological in character.  Hick is not suggesting that the language about Jesus is entirely 
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illusory or false, but that it is poetic hyperbole, representing a spiritual truth that invites an 
appropriate response. 
In general, Hick’s overall objection seems strange for a scholar of world religions.  Cultural 
anthropologists familiar with the world of animism, shamanism and folk-Islam all testify to 
the reality of dual centres of consciousness co-existing within one human body. The reality 
of spiritual beings, for example familiar spirits, communicating through, while residing 
within, another person, such as a witch doctor, is commonplace in world religion. The 
medium retains his or her distinct identity, as does the familiar spirit that occupies and 
mediates through him or her. In other words, two specific personalities with independent 
minds and centres of consciousness co-exist in the one human frame, yet retain distinct 
identities at the same time.  
Hick’s essay evoked a range of scholarly philosophical responses, suggesting that the charge 
of incoherence was not as self-evident as he imagined.  
Thus we find Thomas Morris writing: 
The philosophical question here is whether orthodoxy embraces a possibility. Can 
the doctrine even possibly be true? In recent years many of the critics of the doctrine 
have claimed that the doctrine is incoherent. But I believe that a strategy of defence 
is available which, surprisingly, is fairly simple.47 
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Morris employs a series of distinctions that he suggests set up grounds for a rebuttal of the 
charge of incoherence. He makes a distinction between (a) kind-essence and individual-
essence (b) universal-properties and essential properties, and (c) fully-human and merely 
human. 
The nub of the argument is that Hick’s charge of incoherence would only stand if the 
Christian claim is that Jesus had two individual-essences. However, the ontology of the 
incarnation is explained in terms of Jesus possessing two kind-essences, being fully human, 
but not merely human. While it may be unusual for a being to possess two kind-essences, it 
certainly does not involve a claim that is irrational. Morris adopts a two minds view of the 
incarnation, according to which Jesus had a divine mind that contained, but was not 
contained by, the human mind.  
Hick’s third objection to the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation is ostensibly ethical in 
character:  if Jesus was indeed God in the flesh, then it stands to reason that Christianity is 
exclusively the way to God. The clear implication of this assertion is that other ways of 
salvation as taught by rival world faiths are invalid, and great numbers of religious devotees 
are eternally lost.  
 
1.11 An Interpretation of Religion 
In 1978 Hick delivered a lecture at Claremont Graduate University and was subsequently 
offered the position of Danforth Professor of Philosophy of Religion. For his first three years, 
he split his year between Claremont and Birmingham but in 1982 Hick moved full-time to 
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Claremont. The attraction of Claremont for Hick lay in the move from teaching 
undergraduate students to purely graduate, and also the place accorded by Claremont to 
the study of the philosophy of religion. Unlike Birmingham where the philosophy of religion 
had a marginal place in academia, Claremont provided Hick with an expansive opportunity 
to pursue issues dear to his heart. He spent the next ten years at Claremont teaching, 
organizing conferences in philosophy of religion, and developing his pluralistic hypothesis. In 
1989 Macmillan and Yale University Press published his magnum opus, An Interpretation of 
Religion, the substance of which was drawn from his earlier Gifford Lectures delivered in 
1986-87. The publication was acclaimed as a major contribution to the field of religious 
studies, earning Hick the prestigious Grawemeyer Award and selling over 600,000 copies in 
several languages.  Wilfred Cantwell Smith of Harvard endorsed the work in the following 
terms: 
A movement has been growing among Christians gaining of late in numbers and in 
strength, to appreciate the faith of other religious groups, recognising the spiritual 
depth and the divine grace made available through other traditions as through the 
Christian. Lacking until now however has been a philosophically sophisticated 
statement of the position. Here it is. The rest of us cannot but be grateful.48 
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Hick’s work represents an attempt to critique the phenomenon of religion in its plurality of 
forms, not by means of any specific confessional formula, but rather through a universal 
religious framework.  His argument proceeds along a number of lines before setting forth 
his pluralistic hypothesis. The plurality of beliefs that separate one faith from another, he 
explains in terms of historical circumstance. In short, people subscribe to a given confession 
because they are born within a particular religious culture. It is this existing religious culture 
which structures any given response to a transcendent awareness of the divine reality. 
Hick understands this transcendent experience to be one that delivers to us a consciousness 
of the divine reality or the Real, yet without bringing the worshipper into any actual direct 
contact with that divine reality.  He unpacks this idea (a) philosophically, by employing 
Kant’s distinction between the entity, as it is in itself, and the entity, as it appears in 
perception, and (b) theologically, by citing what he takes to be a traditional Christian 
doctrine of divine ineffability, which, after an historical and comparative analysis, he takes 
to be synonymous with his notion of transcategorial. 
It was only to be expected that the notion of a transcategorial or ineffable entity would 
invite a range of philosophically penetrating questions as to how such a state of affairs can 
be. Placed under scrutiny the idea of a transcategorial entity was not one that commended 
itself to everyone, the primary criticism being that the concept was itself incomprehensible. 
Hick’s initial response to this criticism was disappointing, although he did engage with the 
issues arising at a later date.  For the moment, however, he simply dismissed this 
engagement with his work as unimportant: 
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But these are logical pedantries which need not have worried those classical thinkers 
who have affirmed the ultimate ineffability of the divine nature.49 
Hick’s final chapter in An Interpretation of Religion is one where he seeks to tackle not simply 
the differing but complimentary perspectives in world religion but seemingly irreconcilable 
or incompatible truth claims. His engagement with the conflicting nature of these truth 
claims is not of course with a view to adjudicating between them but simply to consider to 
what extent, if any, this state of affairs militates against his pluralistic hypothesis.  
Hick separates these conflicting claims into three categories: (a) Historical truth claims that 
deal with issues of straightforward historical fact; (b) Trans-historical or cosmological claims 
about the nature of the universe; and (c) Theological representations of the nature of the 
divine being. 
His overall approach to the issues raised was to minimise or dismiss their problematic 
nature along the following lines: (a) Great numbers of believers in the modern world no 
longer consider factual or historical claims to be that upon which faith is grounded. Such 
articles of faith are increasingly being viewed as mythological in character. (b) Many 
disputed beliefs are not soteriologically vital and therefore not crucially important. (c) 
Others require answers which are at presently unknowable or at least unverifiable and 
perhaps in principle will remain so. 
He writes: 
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My conclusion, then, is that the differences between the root concepts and 
experiences of the different religions, their different and often conflicting historical 
and trans-historical beliefs, their incommensurable mythologies, and the diverse and 
ramifying belief-systems into which all these are built, are compatible with the 
pluralistic hypothesis that the great world traditions constitute different conceptions 
and perceptions of, and responses to the Real from within the different cultural ways 
of being human.50 
 
1.12 Later Years 
Hick retired from Claremont in 1992 at the age of 70 and was to describe his tenure at 
Claremont as the happiest of his life, blighted only by the death of his youngest son Mike, 
aged 24, and to a far lesser extent by renewed opposition from a local presbytery.  He kept 
active by attending and participating in philosophical conferences as well as enlarging his 
collection of antiquarian books, an interest that began in his teenage years. His wife died in 
1996 from a heart attack while he himself was in hospital. 
Hick continued to write articles and books while engaging with issues such as the 
relationship between religion and neuroscience yet remaining actively involved in inter-faith 
dialogue. He kept abreast with developments in the field of philosophy of religion and this 
particularly so within the evangelical community of philosophers in the USA. Hick viewed it 
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as somewhat strange that the most incisive work in philosophy of religion was being 
produced by those in the USA such as Plantinga, whose theological stance was so 
conservative on the issues to which he felt most antipathy. 
If asked the question why Hick exhibited such strong opposition to traditional Christian 
theological claims the answer is not difficult to find. In his own mind Hick saw not just an 
historical but a logical and necessary connection between the traditional beliefs of the 
Church and the many social evils in the world.  
Speaking of the doctrine of the deity of Christ he writes: 
The effect of this, particularly in the older and stronger version, has been to make 
Christians feel uniquely privileged in contrast to the non-Christian majority of the 
human race and accordingly free to patronise them religiously, exploit them 
economically and dominate them politically. Thus the dogma of the deity of Christ –
in conjunction with the aggressive and predatory aspect of human nature –has 
contributed historically to the evils of colonialism, the destruction of the indigenous 
civilizations, anti-Semitism, destructive wars of religion and the burning of heretics 
and witches.51 
This conviction seemed to grow and not lessen throughout the course of his lifetime. Hick’s 
writing career spanned some 45 years. His works have provoked over 20 books, more than 
50 academic dissertations and well over 200 journal articles. Hick’s theology was to undergo 
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radical alterations over the years but his basic religious epistemology was to remain largely 
the same since the publication of Faith and Knowledge in 1957. He viewed Mahatma Gandhi 
as the greatest influence on his social conscience while Immanuel Kant provided the 
epistemological insights that he utilised in his pluralistic hypothesis. He also drew upon the 
writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, but not to the extent of his reliance upon Kant.  
In 2011 the University of Birmingham established the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of 
Religion and also awarded him an honorary doctorate of divinity. John Hick died on February 
9th 2012, aged 90. 
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Chapter 2: Epistemology of Religious Experience 
2.1 The Problem of Definition 
Over the last 40 years or so there has been a sustained and concentrated debate on the 
nature of evidence within philosophy of religion and it is to this debate that John Hick has 
made a significant contribution. 
The first problem Hick had to tackle was the thorny issue of deciding what elements may 
rightfully be included in a study of this kind.  At first glance it would appear that a simple 
working definition of ‘religion’ would suffice.  
However Gordon Clark helps us understand why it is difficult to settle upon such a definition 
from the outset. 
He writes: 
In order to discover the common element in all religions it would first be necessary 
to distinguish religious phenomena from all non-religious phenomena. If there were 
an authoritative list of religions, a student could begin to examine them for a 
common element. But before the common element is known, how could an 
authoritative list be compiled?  If Lewis Carroll tells Alice to examine all Snarks and 
find the common nature of the Snark, Alice (at least in her waking moments) would 
not know whether all the objects before her were Snarks or even whether any of 
them were.  Now we are not in much better a position than Alice would be. In our 
attempt to find the common nature of religion we believe that Christianity and Islam 
are religions. But is Hinayana Buddhism a religion? If it is, then a belief in God is not 
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essential to religion.  Should we examine Buddhism, or not? Should we include 
Buddhism on our list? To answer this question one would first have to show the 
essential nature of religion and yet this essential nature is the still unknown object of 
search. It does not help to advise us to begin with a smaller undisputed list. In the 
first place there is no undisputed list at all. Until religion is known, nothing can be 
placed on the list. And in the second place even if we had a smaller undisputed list its 
common elements could not be assumed to be the nature of religion, for with 
religion (even more than with botany) the common element of a longer list is not 
likely to be the common element first observed in the shorter list.52 
Operating within the discipline of cultural anthropology Stephen A. Grunlan and Marvin K. 
Myers write:  
Another social institution found in all cultures is religion.  Every known society 
practices some form of religion. What do we mean by religion? The anthropological 
usage of words often differs from their popular use. To anthropologists the term 
religion refers to the shared beliefs and practices of a society. These beliefs and 
practices form the doctrines and rituals of the religion.53 
The difficulty with defining religion in terms of ‘society’s shared beliefs and practices’ in this 
way is, however, that is seems infinitely elastic and potentially inclusive of many societal 
elements and groupings not normally associated with religion at all.  
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A similar concern is raised by Alister E. McGrath, for example, in relation to the diluting or 
stretching of the nomenclature traditionally used in the field of theological and religious 
studies: 
If the term ‘salvation’ is understood to mean ‘some benefit conferred upon or 
achieved by members of a community, whether individually or corporately’, all 
religions offer ‘salvation’. All –and by no means only religions – offer something.  
However, this is such a general statement that that it is devoid of significant 
theological value. All religions, along with political theories such as Marxism and 
psychotherapeutic schools such as Rogerian therapy –may legitimately be styled 
‘salvific’.54 
However, despite these difficulties the assumption behind Professor Hick’s pluralistic 
hypothesis is that a certain homogenisation of religions and religious experience is possible. 
He writes: 
Our ‘practising mystics’ have spoken both of mystical experience and of the mystic’s 
practices and disciplines. I should like to discuss the former, the religious experience 
and its significance, rather than the practices and techniques which serve it. Mystical 
experience, as our mystics (and others) describe it, does not seem to me to be 
anything other than first-hand religious experience as such. This is however, I believe 
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the essence of religion….religion consists primarily in experiencing our life in its 
relation to the Transcendent and living on the basis of that experience. 55 
Once again it has to be stated that Hick has come under sustained criticism for this 
assertion. Alister E. McGrath, for example, comments:  
Earlier we noted the attempts of various liberal writers to treat ‘culture’ and 
‘experience’ as universals capable of avoiding the particularism which they felt to be 
such an unacceptable feature of traditional Christian thought. In much the same way 
‘religion’ or the hybrid category of ‘religious experience’ is introduced as a third 
potential universal in an attempt to avoid particularity. Each of these three however 
is simply a pseudo universal notion, deriving what little credibility it possesses from 
the totalizing agenda of their proponents. This is now especially clear in the case of 
the category of ‘religion’, which is widely conceded to be a false category, incapable 
of bearing the theological strain of the more adventurous and ambitious pluralistic 
theologies erected upon its spurious foundation. 56 
In other words, McGrath criticises the idea seemingly present throughout Hick’s thesis, viz., 
that religion can be reduced to a single essence and that diverse religions therefore can be 
subsumed under a single genus.  
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This attempt to construct and impose a reductionist understanding and definition of religion 
has also attracted further criticism on the grounds that it represents the imposition of a 
western imperialistic notion of what religion is.   
 McGrath comments further: 
We must therefore be intensely suspicious of the naïve assumption, common to 
western students of religion (and ultimately reflecting their culturally conditioned 
outlook) that ‘religion’ is a well-defined category, which can be sharply and surgically 
distinguished from ‘culture’ as a whole. The fact that classical Greek mythology, 
Confucianism, Taoism, the diverse religions of India which have been misleadingly 
brought together under the generic term ‘Hinduism’ , Christianity, totemism, and 
animism can all be called ‘religion’ points to this being an alarmingly broad and 
diffuse category, without any real distinguishing features.  57 
Given the criticism aimed at Hick’s homogenising approach it is only fair to point out that 
Professor Hick does appear to be very aware of the problem of establishing a tight, 
univocally defined meaning to the word ‘religion’. 
In fact it is in the light of this that he suggests the employment of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
concept of ‘family resemblance’ as offering a more fruitful approach to the problem.  
Speaking of the difficulties inherent in seeking to define ‘religion’, he writes:  
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Scholars have proposed an immense range of definitions of ‘religion’ attempting to 
discriminate between that to which the word does and does not properly apply… all 
these definitional strategies embody and either reveal or conceal commitments… 
but Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance (or, as they have also been 
called, cluster) concepts has opened up the possibility that ‘religion’ is of this rather 
different kind. He took the example of games. They have no common essence. There 
are no characteristics that every member must have; but nevertheless there are 
characteristics distributed sporadically and in varying degrees which together 
distinguish this from a different family.  Using this analogy it is I think illuminating to 
see the different traditions movements and ideologies whose religious character is 
either generally agreed or responsibly debated, not as exemplifying a common 
essence but forming a complex continuum of resemblances and differences 
analogous to those found within a family. 58 
The overall trajectory of Wittgenstein’s thinking on this matter sees him take issue with the 
idea that language-use operates around very strict rules that allow us to state with 
exactitude the precise meaning of a term e.g. ‘games’ by  establishing  what is common to 
all the activities designated as such.    Wittgenstein rejects the notion that words acquire 
their meaning either from the thoughts of the person who voices them, or by simply 
standing for, and corresponding to, objects in reality.    Contrary to this, he points out that 
some words do not have a single essence present in the definition.  As an example of this he 
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selects the word ‘game’ and demonstrates that, despite the varied referents to which the 
word is applied, it is impossible to identify a single thing that is common to all uses of the 
word, and so establish the essence of what a ‘game’ actually is.   Wittgenstein likens this to 
the notion of ‘family resemblance’, according to which family members resemble one 
another, not by means of one single trait, but actually by means of a variety of traits shared 
by some, yet not all, members of the family.   
To illustrate this we may consider a family of four siblings: Alison, Murdo, Carol and 
Norman: 
> Alison, Carol and Murdo all have blonde hair, while Norman has black hair. 
> Alison and Murdo both have large ears, but Norman and Carol have small ears. 
>Murdo, Norman and Carol have blue eyes, but Alison has brown eyes. 
> Norman and Alison have pronounced cheek bones, but Carol and Murdohave sunken 
cheek bones. 
Although, from the same family, and resembling each other in some way, there is no 
common characteristic that all possess, yet there are family traits that are seen in multiple 
members of the family.  Now it is this notion of family resemblance that Wittgenstein 
adopts and applies to language usage, suggesting that the meaning of some words is 
established by means of an identical procedure. Wittgenstein, therefore, advocates the idea 
of ‘family resemblance’ as the better analogy, by which is meant examining and tracing the 
multifarious uses of a word as it relates in a variety of contexts. With such an emphasis the 
strict boundaries that are normally sought to establish the form of a thing, become less 
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important than the typical characteristics exhibited by a thing.   Thus when such an 
approach is applied to the word usage e.g. of religious experience and religion, it does not 
provide us with an exact definition of religion or religious experience, but rather confirms 
typical family characteristics of the same.    For example, we may affirm that all religions 
speak in terms of salvation, and thus establish a commonality between them. However in 
order to appreciate the particulars of salvation as it is understood within each specific 
religion, we must, like Wittgenstein, explore the way the word is used within the religious 
community’s  own language game. 
 
2.2 The Rationality of Religious Belief 
While Hick is best known for his pluralistic thesis, it is his work on (a) the structure, nature 
and warrant of faith, and (b) the relationship of faith to reason, that has drawn appreciation 
from other philosophers, including many who share a common aversion to his revised 
theological views. Hick was later to receive support for this approach to the epistemology of 
faith from virtue epistemologists such as Plantinga, who associated the justification of 
knowledge with properly functioning intellectual faculties in an appropriate environment. 
However, this “Reformed Epistemology” that came to be associated with names such as 
Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame), Nicholas Wolsterstorff (Yale University) and 
William Alston (Michigan, Illinois, and Syracuse) was still in its infancy when Hick was 
working towards the basics of his apologetic. Hick did not set out to prove or argue the 
probability of God’s existence, but rather to establish the epistemic right of rational beings 
to view their religious experience as trustworthy and reliable. 
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He writes: 
The role of philosophical argument is not to prove or to probabilify God’s existence 
but to establish our right as rational beings to trust our religious experience, as we 
trust other modes of experience except in each case where we have good reason to 
doubt them.59 
Again he writes: 
We shall not be asking directly whether A’s ‘experience of existing in the presence of 
God’ is genuine but rather whether it is rational for A to trust his or her experience 
as veridical and to behave on the basis of it.  It is thus evident that when we proceed 
to speak in this chapter of the rationality of belief in God the reference is to the 
rationality of the believing not of what is believed. A proposition believed can be 
true or false: it is the believing of it that is rational or irrational.60 
Thus he has as his focus the justification and provision of a warrant for the believer’s claim 
to have knowledge of God, and not simply unwarranted belief in God that just happened to 
be true. The distinction between knowledge and mere belief can be elucidated by means of 
the following example. 
A person may believe that he will encounter a black dog at 3pm the next day on a certain 
street, and what he believes actually happens.  However although the man’s belief turned 
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out to be true it is also the case that he had no actual grounds for such a belief and 
therefore could not genuinely have known that the event would take place.   What the man 
required for his belief to be converted into knowledge was some sort of further warrant that 
justified his believing in the first instance. 
Traditionally, epistemology has looked to the quality of the reasons given as the grounds for 
converting true beliefs into knowledge. Allied to this requirement is the “ethics of belief” 
concerning one’s responsibility to knowledge and within this scheme is a deontological 
element that requires a person to believe only when a high level of certainty prevails. To 
believe otherwise, it was asserted, is morally wrong.  
 
2.3 Rejection of Foundationalism 
The philosophical world in which Hick’s views were forming was largely committed at this 
level to what is known as “Classical Foundationalism.” Foundationalism, as the name 
suggests, views knowledge as a system, or pyramid structure, built upon first principles, or 
immediately justified beliefs. These beliefs within the structure or system can be divided 
into two types. The first category of beliefs, labelled as “basic” or “foundational” are 
thought to possess such a degree of certainty as to require no evidence or argument. 
The beliefs comprising the second category, or super-structure, derive their justification 
from these immediately justified beliefs in the first category.  The most important 
characteristic, then, of a basic belief, is that its justification is not inferred from any other 
propositions. Basic beliefs are thus analogous to the axioms of a geometric system. 
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Support for this structure of epistemic justification was itself buttressed by the recognition 
that the only alternative to immediately justified beliefs seemed to be either a circular 
argument, or one characterised by an infinite regress.  In other words, justification, it was 
argued, must terminate somewhere for knowledge to be known, and classical 
foundationalism seemed to offer the best solution to this problem. 
In his article on ‘Empirical Knowledge’ in Epistemology: An Anthology Laurence Bonjour, 
quoting Antony Quintin, provides an excellent summary: 
If any beliefs are to be justified at all…there must be some terminal beliefs that do 
not owe their credibility to others. For a belief to be justified it is not enough for it to 
be accepted, let alone merely entertained: there must also be good reason for 
accepting it. Furthermore for an inferential belief to be justified the beliefs that 
support it must be justified themselves. There must, therefore, be a kind of belief 
that does not owe its justification to the support provided by others. Unless this 
were so no belief would be justified at all, for to justify any belief would require the 
antecedent justification of an infinite series of beliefs. The terminal…beliefs that are 
needed to bring regress of justification to a stop need not be strictly self-evident in 
the sense that they somehow justify themselves. All that is needed is that they 
should not owe their justification to any other beliefs.61 
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Concerning the importance and longevity of classical foundationalism within the field of 
epistemology, Norman Geisler comments: 
This argument has had a grip on epistemologists throughout the history of philosophy.62 
And Alvin Plantinga: 
This assumption is part of a larger picture, a total way of thinking of the main 
questions of epistemology which has come to be to be called classical 
foundationalism. Like everyone else I imbibed this picture with my mother’s milk.63 
Now at first glance this appears to be a way of looking at things most suitable for Hick, 
whose doctrine of mystical experience functions as his immediately justified first principle.  
However, in classical foundationalism religious beliefs were not ascribed the status of basic 
beliefs. In order to hold to belief in the existence of God, therefore, what was required was 
a prior supporting foundational belief that rendered e.g. theism probable. In short, religious 
belief needed proof, evidence, or argument reliably deduced or inferred from some basic 
truth that was itself self-evident, a priori or incorrigible. In the case of rationalism this would 
consist in demonstrations of pure reason, or within empiricism the testimony of 
incontrovertible experience.  Conversely, if one could not produce an argument for God’s 
existence that conforms to such criteria, then it would be flouting one’s epistemic duty to 
continue to hold to theistic belief, and to do so would be deemed irrational. For these 
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reasons philosophers of religion concentrated their efforts on defending, developing and 
explicating traditional arguments for God’s existence, or attempting to develop new ones, 
and in so doing tacitly accepted that the burden of proof lay with the theist.  
The validity of approaching the question of the rationality of theistic beliefs in terms of 
argument for and against God’s existence, and this on premises and by procedures, that 
could not be called into question, was for the most part considered as the valid operating 
methodology by Christian philosophers.  Indeed, the challenge of producing theistic 
arguments for the existence of God, and thus conforming to the rigid requirements of 
foundationalism, was not altogether unfruitful, although these arguments took various 
forms.   For example, Alvin Plantinga, prior to the development of his work on belief in God 
as properly basic, sought to demonstrate that belief in “other minds”64 and “belief in God” 
were in the same epistemological boat. Christian philosopher, Gordon Clark, rejected 
traditional theistic arguments as invalid but nonetheless argued that the structure of our 
religious knowledge should be understood according to the model of Euclidean geometry, 
with its basic axioms and derived theorems.65Cornelius Van Til advanced a form of 
transcendental presuppositionalism, arguing that the existence of God alone provided the 
preconditions of intelligibility, and that all other presuppositional starting points fail to do 
so.66 Although these arguments were quite distinct in terms of their logical form and 
                                                          
64
Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. 
65
 Gordon Clark, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. 
66
Cornelius Van Til, The Defence of the Faith. 
61 
 
accompanying truth- tests  they nonetheless conformed to the strictures that required 
existence  of God to be established by means of a rational and persuasive  argument. 
John Hick’s epistemology was of a different character altogether, insofar as he sought to 
establish that, (a) knowledge of God could be legitimately viewed as a basic belief, and (b) 
religious experience itself was sufficient to yield this knowledge.  Hick’s religious 
epistemology was grounded, therefore, in the phenomena of religious experience, and not 
on any traditional argument for God’s existence. 
 The notion of experience maybe best understood as a person’s state of consciousness when 
aware of something apart from himself. This may be a subjective awareness such as self-
consciousness i.e. when the subject views himself as an object and understands that he is 
doing so, or awareness of something outside of himself. In both cases the actual structure of 
the experience involves three components: (a) the individual (b) the object of knowledge 
and (c) the act of knowing. A religious experience is one that is characterised by an 
awareness or consciousness of God or The Transcendent, but may be schematised 
differently by varying schools of thought.  
Thus Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Rudolph Otto (1869-1937), grounding 
religious knowledge in experience, nonetheless understood the nature and characteristics of 
that experience to be different.  
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Norman Geisler succinctly clarifies the difference.  He writes: 
The central difference in their starting points was noted by Otto. Schleiermacher had 
begun with the feeling of dependence and moved from there to “God.” For Otto the 
“Holy” is taken as the primary datum and a feeling of dependence results from this. 
The latter works from the top down, we may say; and the former works from the 
bottom up.67 
Many philosophers, however, consider it too limiting  to apply the term ”religious” only to 
such experiences as would be classed as “mystical” or “numinous.”C. Stephen Evans, for 
example, prefers to speak of the “religious dimension of experience” as opposed to 
“religious experiences” and comments in the following way: 
I believe that this dimension of experience figures heavily in the classical theistic 
arguments for God’s existence. The person who finds the cosmological argument 
convincing is the person who experiences the finite objects in the world (and herself) 
as radically contingent, and, crying out for their dependence on a higher power. The 
person who finds the teleological argument convincing is the person who 
experiences nature as an orderly purposeful reality where the good and beauty 
which are realised are no accident. The person who finds the moral argument 
convincing is the person who perceives certain situations as placing him under 
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objective obligation and who interprets “being obligated” as a relation between 
finite persons and a supreme Person.68 
 
2.4 Mystical Experience as Cognition 
John Hick has as his own basic foundation, then: the phenomena of religious mystical 
experience which he understands to be the very essence of religion. This he takes to be a 
consciousness of the Transcendent, not based upon second hand reporting but on direct 
existential awareness.  As such there may be varying degrees of awareness of the 
Transcendent and also many forms which this consciousness takes. Within his 
epistemological scheme Hick does not believe that the person who has such an experience 
requires any further justification for his belief in God because the very experience itself 
entails the existence of God and is self-authenticating. He writes: 
Those who participate in the realm of religious experience are as rational people 
fully entitled to trust it.69 
As previously mentioned, the notion of religious experience as providing a warrant for 
religious belief, has been developed in different directions by philosophers such as Alvin 
Plantinga70, William Alston71 and Keith Yandell.72Hick seeks further support for his assertion 
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that religious experience should be trusted as a source of knowledge, by citing the principle 
of credulity, which states that a person’s claim to perceive or experience something is prima 
facie justified, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary.  The principle of 
credulity is thus the assertion based on observation that our experience is normally reliable, 
and that if we experience X then this experience provides evidence that X exists. He writes: 
It is a basic principle of life that we trust and act upon our experience except where 
we have reason to distrust it.73 
Other philosophers provide support for Hick’s citation of this principle. 
Richard Swinburne states it in the following way: 
Now it is a basic principle of rationality which I call the principle of credulity, that we 
ought to believe that things are as they seem to be (in the epistemic sense) unless 
and until we have evidence that we are mistaken. 74 
 Nicholas Wolterstorff comments: 
A person is rationally justified in believing a certain proposition that he does believe 
unless he has adequate reason to cease from believing it. Our beliefs are rational 
unless we have reason for refraining; they are not non-rational unless we have 
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reason for believing. They are innocent until proved guilty, not guilty until proven 
innocent.75 
William Alston along similar lines adds: 
Are mystical experiences ever or significantly often genuine experiences of God? 
…The most important philosophical positive reason is this. Any supposition that one 
perceives something to be the case – that there is a zebra in front of one, or that 
God is strengthening one – is prima facie justified. That is, one is justified in 
supposing this unless there are strong enough reasons to the contrary. In the zebra 
case this would include reasons for thinking that there is no zebra in the vicinity and 
reasons for supposing oneself to be subject to hallucinations because of some drug. 
According to this position, beliefs formed on the basis of experience possess an 
initial credibility by virtue of their origin. They are innocent until proven guilty. 76 
Opponents of the notion of religious or mystical experience as a source of knowledge 
supported by the principle of credulity have tended to emphasise the apparent differences 
between mystical or religious experience, and sense experience.  Sense experience 
generates sense perceptual reports that are empirical in nature and subject to some sort of 
further verification whereas religious or mystical experience, it is claimed, being non-
empirical apparently provides no test for any further verification. 
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The question however is not whether there are differences between these two forms of 
perception but whether the differences are epistemically relevant. Why should it be the 
case that only perceptual truth claims substantiated by direct empirical observation be 
deemed veridical in character? What reason can be given for pronouncing sensory 
perception as a necessary condition for access to objective reality?  A great deal of 
knowledge is grounded on something other than sensory perception. For example, laws of 
logic and knowledge of one’s inner state of mind. If God as the object of knowledge is 
understood not to be either visible or material then why would one require some form of 
truth test formulated for objects subject to direct empirical observation to apply? 
William Alston offers a rebuttal along these lines: 
The best response of the mystic is to charge the critic with epistemic imperialism by 
subjecting the outputs of one belief-forming practise to the requirements of 
another77. 
Indeed a counter case can be made for the claim that religious perception and sensory 
perception share more points of coincidence than divergence. 
 J. P. Moreland gives voice to this view when stating: 
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There are several reasons for holding that there is a close analogy between sensory 
perception and numinous religious perception. And since we know that the former is 
usually veridical there is good reason to take the latter as usually veridical.78 
John Hick, contrasting experience with propositional revelation, states: 
I therefore want to explore the possibility that cognition of God by faith is more like 
perceiving something, even perceiving a physical object that is present before us, 
than it is like believing a statement about some absent object, whether because the 
statement has been proved to us or because we want to believe it. The hypothesis 
that we want to consider is not that religious faith is sense perception but that as a 
form of cognition by acquaintance it is more like sense perception than propositional 
belief.79 
And again: 
My conclusion, then, is that the obvious differences between sensory and religious 
experience do not constitute a valid reason to rule out the latter as delusory. It is 
entirely reasonable, rational, and sane for those who participate in what is 
apparently an awareness of the Transcendent to believe, and to base their lives on 
the belief, that in living as physical beings within a natural world we are at the same 
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time living in relation to a transcendent-and-immanent reality whose presence 
changes the meaning for us of everything that we do and that happens to us.80 
For Hick religious experience functioned as a foundational and basic self- authenticating 
claim. He says: 
Our ordinary daily activity presupposes a general trust in the veridical character of 
perceptual experience… that is to say we are so constituted that we cannot help 
believing and living in terms of the objective reality of the perceived world.81 
 
2.5 Epistemological Structure 
Now according to Hick the same epistemological structure we bring to bear on the process 
of knowing religiously applies to all of our cognising activity, irrespective of the actual 
objects of knowledge. All knowledge for Hick begins with experience and, as previously 
stated, experience may be thought of as the state of consciousness that an individual has 
who is aware of something outside of or within himself.  However, according to Hick the 
human mind is not passive when experiencing an awareness of the world, but rather filters 
and organises the data received, by imposing order and meaning upon it, and this, by means 
of concepts already present in or to the mind.  He writes: 
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The basic fact that the mind imposes order and meaning upon the data it receives is 
true at all levels of awareness, physical, moral, aesthetic and religious.82 
Thus, the function of the mind is inseparable from the intelligibility and objective reality of 
the universe, and all knowledge is the human interpretation of this objective reality. In 
order to illustrate this feature that is common to all acts of knowing, Hick draws upon 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s use of puzzle pictures, such as Jarrow’s duck-rabbit explaining the 
notion of “seeing as” and likens this to his own conception of “experiencing as”. 
Hick further sets forth the idea that this activity of interpretation, which gives rise to 
knowledge, operates at four levels. Natural Knowledge encompasses our awareness of e.g. 
physical objects such as trees and motorcycles. No real ambiguity exists concerning our 
awareness and interpretation of such things.  
Moral Judgements which are ethical in character are more complex as objects of knowledge 
than natural knowledge, and a third category i.e. Aesthetic Taste, admits of a broader 
ambiguity with a wider range of opinion as to the value or worth of, for example, a work of 
art. The fourth level of knowledge is that of Religious Faith, which, because of the 
ambiguous nature of the universe, is less coercive as an object of knowledge, but of course 
equally valid to those to whom this interpretation is persuasive. 
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What distinguishes one level of knowledge from another is the greater or lesser degree of 
cognitive freedom exercised in relation to it.  Hick writes: 
Our cognitive freedom increases in relation to the value-laden aspects of our 
environment83 
With respect to God as the object of religious knowledge Hick insists that an additional 
factor is present. Within the human constitution there is an aspect of our being that is “in 
tune” with God, and although this has many religious labels we may refer to this 
phenomenon as “the image of God.”He writes: 
It is this aspect of our being that is affected by the Ultimately Real to the extent that 
we are open to that reality.84 
Hick seemed to follow what he understood to be the teaching of Irenaeus that the “image of 
God” refers to that which is our rational moral personhood, and the “likeness of God” as 
that which refers to the person’s “complete spiritual transformation”.85 
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2.6 The Critical Realist Principle 
At this point it is necessary to understand that Hick’s correlation between the interpretative 
function of the mind and God as an object of knowledge, is slightly different than a common 
sense understanding of that experience. When Hick speaks of an objective reality that can 
be known, he nonetheless insists that this reality as an object of knowledge cannot be 
known directly. We know the object of knowledge only as it appears i.e. as already 
interpreted and structured by the categories of thought imposed upon the object by the 
human mind. These religious categories are not universal and invariable, but are culture-
relative and consist of the religious ideas that are brought to bear upon the basic awareness 
of the transcendent. 
Thus while there is a subject/object distinction, both subjectivity and objectivity exist only in 
relation to the knowing subject and within the mind. In some ways therefore this is not 
dissimilar to the structure of self-conscious awareness where the subject views itself as an 
object, and understands that it is doing so. He writes: 
The critical realist principle – that there are realities external to us but that we are 
never aware of them as they are in themselves, but always as they appear to us with 
our particular cognitive machinery and conceptual resources – is thus a vital clue to 
understanding what is happening in the different forms of religious experience.86 
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 This epistemological scheme is not original to Hick but is drawn from his lifelong study of 
Immanuel Kant. Prior to Kant, philosophers had assumed and argued that human cognition 
is such that it conforms to the objects of knowledge.  Kant’s proposal was to assume the 
opposite i.e. that the objects conform to the conditions of cognition. He does not deny that 
that all knowledge begins with experience but rather insists that it does not arise out of 
experience.  Empirical knowledge is resultant upon sensory impressions and something the 
mind contributes to this. The task Kant set himself was that of distinguishing the a priori 
factors or knowledge that is independent of all sense impression from the a posteriori 
contributions of sense. 
According then to Kant the way we acquire or generate knowledge by means of cognition is 
that the human mind engages with the phenomenal world of appearances by structuring 
the phenomena we perceive in accordance with certain principles or categories.  In other 
words, for something to be an object of knowledge it has to conform to the categories of 
the mind.  Kant further, distinguished the phenomenal world from the noumenal world and 
explained such in the following way. The phenomenal world is the realm of sense 
experience or appearances and the noumenal world is the world as it actually is or as it is in 
itself.  Things in themselves are things as they exist independently of human cognition, and 
appearances are things that exist as contents or objects of sensible representations   Thus 
from the standpoint of the enquirer we have cognition only of the phenomenal world of 
appearances but not of the noumenal world of the things in themselves.  However, while we 
cannot know the noumenal we can postulate the noumenal to account for the appearances, 
or phenomenal world, we experience, or are confronted with. Whether Kant is making an 
ontological (two world) distinction here or an epistemological (two aspect) distinction one is 
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a matter of live debate among Kantian scholars.87  The main difference between Kant and 
Hick is that categories within Kant’s epistemology are universal and invariable but Hick’s, 
being religious in nature, are culture-relative. 
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Chapter 3: Who or What is God? 
3.1 God as Ineffable 
While Hick’s primary concern is to establish the epistemic right of believers to trust their 
experience of God, the question of who or what God is must now be addressed. For John 
Hick there exists an ultimate, but directly unknowable, reality commonly designated “God” 
or “Ultimate Reality” by religious devotees.  This God is unknowable in the sense that the 
ultimate reality’s inner nature is beyond the reach of human conceptual categories and 
linguistic systems. Hick’s view corresponds to the statement issued on 15th November 1215 
by the Fourth Lateran Council convened by Pope Innocent III where it was confessed that 
there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, 
incomprehensible and ineffable. 
Keith Yandell unpacks the idea of ineffable: 
The claim that something is ineffable is a strong claim: it says that something is 
inexpressible, uncapturable in language, aconceptual, equidistant from all concepts, 
something about which nothing true or false can be said.88 
Gordon Kaufman represents this view of things along the following lines: 
The real reference for “God” is never accessible to us or in any way open to our 
observation or experience. It must remain always an unknown – X, a mere limiting 
idea with no content. It stands for the fact that God transcends our knowledge in 
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modes and in ways of which we can never be aware and of which we have no inkling. 
God is ultimately profound Mystery and utterly escapes or every effort to grasp or 
comprehend him. Our concepts are at best metaphors and symbols of his being, not 
literally applicable89 
The term Hick employs to describe the object of our worship is the Ultimate Real. This 
Ultimate Real is “transcategorial” or “ineffable” and the various world faiths with their 
seeming contradictory beliefs systems are but differing yet complimentary responses to this 
one ultimate reality as it impacts us by means of a transcendent experience. 
Hick in his study of historical Christianity gradually came to identify the spirituality of 
mysticism as a fruitful field of enquiry, which to a greater or lesser extent supported his 
contention that God is ineffable. He noticed that prior to the 13thcentury Christian mystics 
typically produced works of biblical exegesis in which they sought to bring out the mystical 
meaning latent in the texts of scripture, but that this emphasis progressively shifted to the 
reporting of mystical-experiential encounters with God, the result of which was not a unity 
of being, but a union of wills as the human is fully conformed to the divine. Hick was 
particularly taken with the works of Pseudo-Dyonysius, whose writings provide support for 
his own emphasis upon God as unknowable. 
Concerning the corpus of his works he states: 
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They have probably been more influential than any other within the Christian 
tradition apart from St. Paul… such was his influence that he was cited as an 
authority by Aquinas some 1700 times.90 
Mystics emphasised the reality of religious experience but the nature of the experience was 
increasingly indescribable the closer one approximated to union with or awareness of the 
divine. Hick, placing this doctrine of the Ultimate Real within the tradition of historical 
mystical theology, breaks new ground in taking the implication of God’s ineffability to what 
he understands to be a more radical though logical conclusion: 
I am not fond of the word ‘ineffable’ and prefer ‘transcategorial’, meaning beyond 
the range of our human systems or concepts or mental categories.  Theologians have 
nearly always taken the ultimate divine ineffability or transcategoriality for granted 
though usually without taking its implications to their logical conclusion.  Augustine, 
for example, about a century before Pseudo-Dionysius said that God transcends 
even the mind but did not develop this further.  But Dionysius –or Denys, to give him 
a more user friendly name – makes the divine ineffability central and begins at least 
to struggle with its implications. In his central work, The Mystical Theology, he says 
in every way he can think that God is utterly and totally transcategorial. God is 
indescribable, beyond all being and knowledge.91 
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This notion of God or gods as excessively transcendent to the point of being scarcely 
knowable was prevalent in the thinking of Plato, Philo and in particular enjoyed a central 
place in the teachings of Gnosticism. Herman Bavinck traces the influence of this mystical 
strand as one that fed into the thinking of the early Greek Church Fathers, Augustine in the 
West, and Pseudo-Dionysious, before being affirmed at a later date (but to a lesser extent) 
by the Scholastics. Charting these developments through the course of Church history, he 
writes: 
Christian theology made the idea of God’s incomprehensibility and unknowability its 
point of departure: Barnabas, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, 
Athanasius, Origen, Eusebius, Augustine, John of Damascus, and many others held 
agnostic or semi-agnostic views.92 
Confirming Hick’s reading of Pseudo-Dionysius he writes: 
Pseudo-Dionysius (appealed to by John of Damascus) and Scotus Erigena held views 
concerning God’s being, which were even more agnostic. The Areopagite taught that 
there is no concept, expression or word by which God’s being can be indicated. 
Accordingly, whenever we wish to designate God we use metaphorical language. He 
is “supersubstantial infinity, supermental unity” etc.  We cannot form a conception 
of that unitary, unknown being, transcendent above all being, above goodness, 
above every name and word and thought. 93 
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Bavinck is not himself endorsing this view, for commenting upon God’s incomprehensibility 
he writes: 
Holy Scripture corroborates this as strongly as possible; yet it presents a doctrine 
concerning God which maintains his knowability.94 
Hick, therefore, by means of his engagement with Christian mystics and other spiritual 
devotees from world religions, arrives at the point where the application of human concepts 
to God is considered by him to be a category mistake.  God does have an inner nature, 
according to Hick, but we are unable to source any information about this within the range 
of our human conceptual resources. 
The concept of ineffability is one that approximates to, but is quite distinct from, a cluster of 
related emphases attached to theological enquiry, such as the following. 
 
3.2 God as Transcendent 
The first idea that seems naturally to associate itself with God as ineffable is that of 
“transcendence”, which although conceptually quite distinct is at times used in such a way 
as to suggest that a writer actually has the notion of “ineffable” in mind. Lorant Hegedus 
provides a summary of how the doctrine of God’s transcendence has come to be 
understood by many theologians and philosophers of religion operating within the Christian 
tradition. He writes: 
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Even the shortest summary must indicate the following aspects and forms: 1) The 
ontological form of transcendence is the otherness of God’s existence, which makes 
it discontinuous with our own: he as Creator and New Creator is in ‘infinite 
qualitative difference’ from the creatures that are in need of salvation (Kierkegaard). 
2) The linguistic form of transcendence means the ineffability, or rather 
unnameability of God, which declares his absolute sovereignty because without a 
name for a person it is impossible to gain power over him in the sense of the 
revelation of the Old Testament. 3) The moral form of transcendence is the holiness 
of God who is perfectly just, good and the overflowing fountain of ‘goodness’. 4) The 
epistemological form of transcendence is God’s incomprehensibility. In mysticism 
this means the total unknowability of the transcendent God. In a theology on biblical 
foundations it is combined with a doctrine of revelation: ‘The secret things belong 
to… God, but the things that are revealed belong to us ‘(Duet.29:29). In the first 
place the believer knows how incomprehensible is the God who reveals himself. 5) 
The logical form of transcendence appears in the threefold variety in the history of 
theology. In the via negativa, it is affirmed that God, who lives in inaccessible light, 
can be recognised only by negations of every finite attribute and attitude of earthly 
life. The via analogical speaks about the transcendent God by means of similarity-in-
difference of God and his creatures. The language of paradox endeavours to 
combine the insights of the other two.95 
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The transcendence of God has thus come to be understood by theologians and philosophers 
of religion as a term which encapsulates but is not limited to such truths as God’s exaltation 
and mysteriousness.  It seeks to convey the idea of God’s being over and beyond the 
created order although the extent to which he is understood to be so can vary greatly in 
world religion. However, taken to an extreme God’s transcendence has become almost 
synonymous with the idea of ineffability.   
John Frame commenting upon this writes: 
The transcendence of God (His exaltation, His mysteriousness) has been understood 
as God’s being infinitely removed from the creation, being so far from us , so “wholly 
other” and “wholly hidden” that we can  have no knowledge of him and can make no 
true statements about Him. Such a god, therefore, has not revealed – and perhaps 
cannot reveal – himself to us. He is locked out of human life, so that for all practical 
purposes we become our own gods. God says nothing to us and we have no 
responsibilities to Him.96 
This exposition of God’s transcendent “otherness” within Christian thought requires another 
perspective which is perhaps more true to how the idea is used in Scripture. John Frame 
comments: 
It is not biblical therefore to interpret God’s transcendence to mean merely that he 
is located somewhere far away in heaven. That may be part of the thrust of the 
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terms “Most High,” “exalted” and “lifted up” but there must be more to it.  What is 
the additional content? We should, I think, see these expressions primarily as 
describing God’s royal dignity. He is “exalted,” not mainly as someone living far 
beyond the earth but as one who sits on a throne. The expressions of transcendence 
refer to God’s rule, his Kingship, his lordship… so the transcendence of God is best 
understood not primarily as a spatial concept but as a reference to God’s kingship. 97 
 
3.3 God as Incomprehensible 
The second idea that seems naturally to associate itself with God as ineffable is that of 
“incomprehensible”, although theologians have generally found the formulating of any 
precise distinction between God’s incomprehensibility and his knowability to be a complex 
task.  Indeed, as John Frame has stated, the very notion of God as incomprehensible is itself 
a problem for us. He writes: 
But we must remember that the concept of incomprehensibility is self-referential, 
that is, if God is incomprehensible then even His incomprehensibility is 
incomprehensible. We can no more give an exhaustive explanation of God’s 
incomprehensibility than we can give of God’s eternity, infinity, righteousness or 
love.98 
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The notion of God as one who is incomprehensible maybe taken to mean that our 
knowledge of God never expands nor indeed can do so to the point of knowing God fully or 
exhaustively. In other words, we can never know God as precisely as he knows himself.  
Nonetheless within this understanding there is room for the twin claim that we can know, 
and know truly, a great deal about God, and that this knowledge is resultant upon God 
choosing to engage in acts of self-disclosure.  God is free to reveal himself to us and this 
revelation is intended to communicate truths about himself to us that can be understood. 
 
3.4 The Essence of God 
The discussion on what may and may not be known of God has at times encompassed a 
range of considerations that seem broadly supportive of the overall trajectory of Hick’s 
thinking on God as one who is ineffable.   For example, can we know God in himself or do we 
know him in limited fashion only in relation to us? 
Even Reformed theologians such as Herman Bavinck are not always consistent in their 
wrestling with this issue. So, for example, he states categorically: 
There is no knowledge of God as he is in himself. 99 
However at a later stage of his book he distinguishes his discussion of the Trinity from his 
discussion of God’s decrees by stating the following: 
Thus far we have dealt with God’s being as it is in itself 100 
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Now it may be at this point that Bavinck is distinguishing between the ontological trinity, 
which focuses upon who God is, and the economical trinity, the focus of which is upon what 
God does. Taken together, these two terms present the paradox of the Trinity: the Father, 
Son and Spirit share one nature, but they are different Persons and have different roles. 
However despite the distinction, not every theologian finds the notion of “God in himself“, 
to be a helpful one. 101  For those who do, it is generally taken to refer to the essence of God, 
which is understood as that essential quality which makes God what he is and without 
which he would cease to be.  However, once again the attempt to isolate and identify that 
which is God’s essence is problematic.  How, then, can we establish what factors about God 
constitute his essence?  
One approach has been to seek to establish the essence of God by identifying those 
attributes which are essential to God’s ontology from those which are not. Strip away the 
non-essential attributes, and the end product will be those which define his essential 
nature.  
All this seems fairly straightforward providing the attributes are viewed as “parts of God” 
rather than “perspectives upon God”, and that some sort of criterion is established to help 
distinguish essential from non-essential attributes.  
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However, as Millard Erickson has outlined, the relationship of God to his attributes is itself a 
complex issue, since it raises the question as to whether God possesses his attributes, or are 
the attributes themselves in part or whole expressive of God’s essential nature?  
Noting several different and possible conceptions of God’s relationship to his attributes he 
writes: 
These can be put in popular form by noting several models.   (1) The pincushion 
model. This is the view that God has an essence or being which is unknown to us and 
several attributes that attach like pins stuck to a pincushion. They are not the 
essence of God. They are logically distinguishable from God’s nature and from his 
other attributes. (2) The bundle or building model. This says that God is a composite 
of his attributes. They are like a bundle of sticks bound together or perhaps like the 
bricks that make up a wall. They are all distinct from one another, but together they 
form the entirety, the bundle or the wall. God is his attributes but he is not those 
individually but collectively. (3) The facets or diamond model. On this model the 
essence of God is not something hidden beneath the attributes. The essence of God 
is unitary. The attributes are not really separate from one another either. They are 
simply facets, different ways of viewing his nature in relation to different 
perspectives. 102 
Another perspective is one that defines God in terms of his attributes.  God is his essence 
and when we know his attributes we know him. This is not to say that we can know him 
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exhaustively but rather what we do know of him we know truly.   If God were to be 
dispossessed of any attribute this would not clarify his essence but would rather alter his 
essence and he would cease to be whatever he had been up until that point.  The view that 
God is identical with his attributes or properties and that his essence is indivisible in the 
sense that his attributes are not parts of his nature is identified theologically as the doctrine 
of “God’s simplicity.”  This view has enjoyed a broad base of support throughout the history 
of Christian theology, although it has been subject to criticism by others such as, for 
example, Alvin Plantinga103and Ronald Nash.104Indeed the debate over God’s simplicity is not 
a new one but formed part of a larger dispute in medieval times between the realists and 
the nominalists over the issue of universals, which itself was the result of the teaching of 
Plato with regards to forms or ideas.105One contemporary objection to the doctrine of 
simplicity has been framed in the following way: 
If God is identical with each of his properties, then, since each of his properties is a 
property, he is a property – a self-exemplifying property. Accordingly, God has just 
one property: himself. This view is subject to a difficulty both obvious and 
overwhelming. No property could have created the world; no property could be 
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omniscient, or indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property then he isn’t a 
person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or 
life. So taken the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake.106 
It must be conceded at the outset that if God is a property, then indeed he cannot be a 
person. However, in Christian theism God is a person and not simply a collection of abstract 
attributes.  Is it not better to understand the attributes as a way of describing him as a 
person, in the same way we employ attributes, virtues, or properties to describe other 
persons? This would certainly be the view of God taken by those whose worship of God is 
recorded in the Bible. When people praise God for his love and mercy, for example, they are 
not under the impression they are directing this adulation to an abstract attribute which 
resides in God. Rather they are praising God as a personal relational being whose character 
reflects mercy and love, answering the question, what kind of person is he? Carl F.H. Henry 
provides a summary of this position: 
Evangelical theology insists on the simplicity of God. By this it means that God is not 
compounded of parts: he is not a collection of perfections but rather a living centre 
of activity pervasively characterised by all his distinctive perfections. The divine 
attributes are neither additions to the divine essence nor qualities pieced together 
to make a compound…God’s variety of attributes does not conflict with God’s 
simplicity because his simplicity is what comprises the fullness of divine life.107 
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Thus for Hick: 
God… cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, conscious or unconscious, 
purposive or non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving or hating. 
None of these descriptive terms apply literally to the un-experienceable reality that 
underlies that realm. 108 
In anticipation of the objection that such an analysis reduces God to a tabula rasa he writes: 
It is worth stressing that the divine ineffability does not entail that the ultimate 
reality which we are calling God is an empty blank, but rather that God’s inner 
nature is beyond the range of our human resources.109 
Strangely enough, Hick’s assertion that God is ineffable, and that we can only know what 
properties he does not have, seems to involve something of a contradiction.  
Thomas Morris writes: 
To claim that God escapes characterisation by most substantive informative human 
concepts is to make a fairly weighty claim which itself seems to imply or presuppose 
some pretty important knowledge about God. How can we ever be justified in saying 
what something is not unless we have a sense of what it is? This one question 
reveals the weakness endemic to any severely or exclusively negative theology. 
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Rational denial seems clearly to presuppose rational affirmation. Knowledge of what 
something is not seems to be based upon knowledge of what to some extent it is. 110 
This idea of ineffability as applied to God has come in for a great deal of scrutiny from other 
philosophers, some of whom regard the whole thesis as wanting and incoherent.  Hick 
consistently responded to such analysis of his thesis by dismissing it. 
However, contemporary philosophical discussions on ineffability concentrate upon the very 
area that Hick seems reluctant to ascribe any real importance to.  
Keith Yandell asserts: 
Without some restriction being made on it –that is, in its pure and pristine state – 
the thesis that something is ineffable simply is contradictory, and so false. To put the 
objection in different language if some proposition is true of some item, then 
concepts –namely those expressed by the sentence that expresses this proposition –
apply to this item. The truth of God as ineffable requires what it forbids – it is true 
only if those concepts which in their interrelationships comprise the proposition in 
question apply to God, in flagrant violation of the proposition’s content.  So one 
needs a characterisation of ineffability, which is not logically inconsistent but 
captures as much as possible of the stringency of our first characterisation.111 
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Hick refines his argument by means of a distinction between two different classifications of 
properties. He speaks of “substantial properties” which refer to God as “good” “powerful” 
or “all knowing” and “purely formal and logically generated properties” which identify such 
properties as must apply to anything.  In this sense it may be easier to think of logically 
generated properties as predicates. When speaking in this way Hick presumably has in mind 
those properties which anything must have in order to exist at all. 
However, is it not the case that logically generated properties or predicates are telling us 
something that is true of God? Hick’s response is to assert that formal properties do not 
actually disclose anything positive about the nature of God.  He states: 
Modern philosophical discussions of ineffability have introduced a distinction 
between, on the one hand, what we can call substantial attributes meaning 
attributes which tell us something positive about the divine nature, and, on the 
other hand, purely formal linguistically generated attributes which do not tell us 
anything about the divine nature. Thus that God is ineffable formally entails that God 
has the attribute of ineffability. And even to refer to God at all entails that God has 
the attribute of being able to be referred to. But such purely formal attributes give 
rise only to trivial truths, trivial in the sense that they do not in any way contradict or 
undermine the divine ineffability.112 
The problem with properties generated by logic alone is not that we cannot think of such 
predicates, but rather that Hick seems to smuggle in substantial properties under the guise 
                                                          
112
 John Hick,Who or What is God?  And Other Investigations, 6. 
90 
 
of logically generated ones.  Speaking of the divine noumenon as the postulated ground of 
religious experience, he writes: 
All that we can say of the divine noumenon is that it is the source and ground of all 
those experienced realities, as also of human minds which are aware of these 
different phenomenal forms113 
However, it seems quite impossible to make such a statement and not to concede that we 
are saying something positive about God, not the least of which is the causal impact of God 
upon human consciousness. On other occasions Hick speaks along similar lines leaving the 
reader with the very distinct impression that the divine noumenon is being disclosed well 
beyond the limitations of properties generated only by logic. 
For example, he writes: 
The broad hypothesis which I am suggesting then is that the Infinite Spirit presses in 
all the time upon the multiplicity of finite human spirits.114 
The attribute of “infinity” is generally taken to mean that God is a being not limited by 
anything outside of himself.  In one sense Hick may argue that this is not actually ascribing a 
substantial property to God but rather is highlighting the absence of something, i.e. 
limitation.  However, it would appear that when infinity is applied to time and space the 
positive attributes of eternity and omnipresence are the inevitable outcome.   
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This dilemma is summed up well by Alvin Plantinga, who writes: 
Hick distinguishes positive attributions of the Real from statements of negative 
theology primarily on the basis of whether they appear to be saying that the Real has 
a certain property. But looks can be deceiving. Take the sentence ‘James is not 
married’, apparently saying that James lacks a certain property. But the sentence 
‘James is a bachelor’ which has the same content, apparently attributes a substantial 
property to James. If a substantial property attribution can masquerade as a claim of 
negative theology, and a piece of negative theology can be dressed up to look like a 
substantial property attribution, we require from Hick a more clearly stated criterion 
for how to distinguish cases.115 
The difficulty however is more acute than this lack of clarity in respect of criteria.  Hick’s 
negation of all positive properties is itself beset with greater problems. Returning to his 
earlier statement: 
God…cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, conscious or unconscious, 
purposive or non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving or hating. 
None of these descriptive terms apply literally to the un-experienceable reality that 
underlies that realm.116 
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This list comprises a series of seven contradictory predicates, none of which can be ascribed 
to, or predicated of, Hick’s ineffable God: 
1. Neither one nor many. 
2. Neither person nor thing. 
3. Neither conscious nor unconscious. 
4. Neither purposive nor not purposive. 
5. Neither substance nor process. 
6. Neither good nor evil. 
7. Neither loving nor hating. 
However, it is surely impossible to envisage what the ontological status of such an entity 
could be. The description is quite incoherent.  As Douglas Groothuis has said: 
Hick appears to be defining the Real out of existence altogether.117 
In other words it is not possible to set up two predicates that stand in contradictory 
relationship to one another and assert that both cannot be true. One or other of the 
predicates must be true because there is no other possibility.  Thus when Hick states that 
God is neither conscious nor unconscious he has exhausted all logical possibilities. He 
suggests that God is neither one nor many yet addresses God in the singular. At other times 
he speaks of the love of God yet describes him as neither good nor evil. Curiously enough 
within Hick’s soteriology the fruit of God’s influence upon people’s lives is seen in the moral 
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qualities that stretch across the various faith communities.  But how can this can be so if the 
divine reality does not possess moral qualities nor is directed by a sense of purpose? The 
absence of moral qualities or properties rules out the propriety of one course of action over 
another within the sphere of religiously-inspired ethics.   
Thus Keith Yandell writes: 
If God indeed were ineffable (or ineffable save for existence entailed properties), 
then we would be justified in supposing that no standard of behaviour was any more 
religiously or theistically appropriate than any other : it would presumably be as 
appropriate to sacrifice children as to construct facilities for their care, or to curse 
God as to praise him.118 
Given Hick’s commitment to the ineffability doctrine, it is difficult to see how he could 
construct a viable doctrine of Revelation consistent with it.  The notion of mystical 
experience as cognition, and faith as interpretation, seems at odds with the accompanying 
claim that the noumenon can have no causal relationship to the phenomenon, and that 
there is never knowledge of the nuomenon, only of the phenomena. The object of 
knowledge is appearance, never reality.  
As Christopher Sinkinson points out: 
Normally, when considering Kant, critics describe the problem in terms of the 
inability of the human mind to penetrate beyond that given in appearances to know 
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the thing-in-itself, but significantly for theology the problem is symmetrical. It is 
impossible for the thing- in-itself to reveal itself as phenomenon or as the thing-for-
others. The barrier is insurmountable from either side because this epistemology 
supposes that all knowledge is conditioned by the mind… The price of Hick’s use of 
this Kantian insight is the impossibility of the Ultimate Real being able to disclose 
itself in any way whether through inner experience or verbal prophecy. Revelation is 
impossible not only because direct knowledge of divine reality is impossible; it is also 
impossible because the Ultimate Real cannot in any way that we know or describe 
influence or affect, the world of appearances.119 
John Hick has stated that God cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, conscious 
or unconscious, purposive or non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving or 
hating.  
As we have seen this assertion has been criticized on the grounds that it is not possible to 
set up two predicates that stand in contradictory relationship to one another, and assert 
that both cannot be true. In other words, one or other of the predicates must be true, 
because he has exhausted all logical possibilities. Put another way, in asserting his claim 
Hick is violating laws of logic. 
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3.5 Laws of Logic 
This refutation of Hick’s assertion is based on the belief that no such world or state of affairs 
can be thought to exist, in which the laws of logic do not obtain. In other words, there 
appears to be a certainty about laws of logic very much in the same way that there is 
certainty about mathematics, and this certainty is of such a nature that it is impossible to 
imagine a world where such laws do not obtain. In other words, is there only one logic?  If 
one accepts the premise of an argument, then there is a corresponding compulsion to 
accept the conclusion that follows inexorably from it. John Frame explores this notion of 
obligation or compulsion in the following statement: 
The necessity (to accept the conclusion) is not physical. No one is pulling strings on 
our vocal chords, physically compelling us to assert the conclusion of a valid 
argument. The compulsion can be resisted and often is; many people refuse to 
assent to sound argument despite the “must”, the necessity, of logical inference.  
Nor is the necessity pragmatic, in any obvious way. That is to say, we do not accept 
logical conclusions merely because doing that makes life more pleasant for us or 
serves our self interest in some obvious way. Often accepting a logical conclusion 
makes life harder; thus many flee from the reality represented by the conclusion of a 
sound argument. 120 
The point being made by Frame is that there is something of an analytic necessity behind 
the compulsion to accept the validity of the conclusion of an argument. Indeed, it may be 
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stated that if someone believes a premise, then what that premise entails by way of 
implication is something the human mind does accept, and cannot but accept. 
Now it may well be that such knowledge is suppressed by the person as a moral agent, but 
at some level of consciousness the truth of the argument is assented to.   We may doubt, for 
example, an historian’s analysis of the reasons behind the Vietnam War, but we are not 
going to doubt either that 3+3 = 6, or the valid conclusion to the syllogism that if all men are 
mortal and Socrates is a man, then he too is mortal.  
Again as Frame suggests:  
A syllogism seems to carry with it a certainty that transcends all sense experience 
that takes precedence over all non-logical and nonmathematical claims. 121 
Thus, in all possible worlds, for example, it is commonly held that reality will correspond to 
the following 3 laws: 
i) Law of Identity 
Any entity is what it is and not something else.  Thus a horse is a horse and not a dog. (If p 
then p) 
ii) Law of non-contradiction 
An entity cannot have logically incompatible properties, or be A and not A at the same time 
in the same way.  Thus, a horse cannot be not a horse.  (not both P and not P) 
iii) Law of the excluded middle 
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An entity is either some particular thing or it is not. A horse is either a horse or not a horse. 
(Either p or not p)  
Gordon Clark unpacks the implication of any denial of, for example, the law of non-
contradiction.  He writes: 
If contradictory statements are true of the same subject at the same time evidently 
all things will be the same thing. Socrates will be a ship, a house, as well as a man. 
But if precisely the same attributes attach to Crito that attach to Socrates it follows 
that Socrates is Crito. Not only so but the ship in the harbour since it has the same 
list of attributes too will be identified with this Socrates-Crito person. In fact 
everything will be the same thing. All differences among things will vanish and all will 
be one.122 
Indeed, Clark commenting upon the status of the law of non-contradiction: 
The principle, be it noted again, is stated not merely as a law of thought but 
primarily as a law of being. The ontological form is basic, the purely logical is 
derivative: it becomes a law of thought because it is first a law of being. 123 
However, these conditions notwithstanding, contemporary theology for the most part 
evidences little positivity towards the place of logic in theological discourse but is replete 
with warnings against an over reliance upon it. 
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John Frame writes: 
Today, however, it is hard to imagine Calvinists being accused of over confidence in 
logic. Except in the writings of Gordon H. Clark, John H. Gerster, and some of their 
disciples it is difficult now in fact to find any positive words about logic in Reformed 
theology and easy to find warnings against its misuse. Berkouwer frequently warns 
us against developing doctrine by drawing deductive inferences. Van Til, while not 
denying the legitimacy of logical inference, is more concerned with the dangers of 
over reliance on logic than he is with the dangers of neglecting it. The followers of 
Dooyeweerd, too, are more concerned with the danger of absolutizing the logical 
aspect than they are over the danger of being illogical.124 
Now it has to be said that this aversion to logic is not something unique to the pursuit of 
theological or religious studies. 
Dallas Willard commenting upon contemporary trends in American academia writes: 
An understanding of ordinary logic is no longer a required part of university degree 
courses, as was almost universally the case sixty years ago.125 
Such aversion, however, has not always prevailed. Within post-Reformation circles in the 
17th century, theology was increasingly shaped by a form of protestant scholasticism. Such 
scholasticism dates from around 1550-1830 and is associated with the era of “confessional 
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orthodoxy’ which was prevalent in Protestant and Catholic universities of Western Europe. 
The application of the term “scholastic” to such post-Calvin and post-Luther theologians was 
of course pejorative, as it was when deprecatingly applied to the earlier scholastics of the 
Middle- Ages.  
Early scholasticism is best viewed as a medieval movement, prevalent in the period 1250-
1500, which aimed at the systematising of Christian theology with the aim of demonstrating, 
and thus defending, the rational character of its truth-claims. The first task the scholastic 
thinkers set themselves was that of establishing a method of enquiry around which 
theological thought could be organised.  The search for a methodology eventually settled on 
the philosophy of Aristotle, whose writings were being rediscovered in the late 12th and 
early 13th Century. Thus Christian theological dogma was organized around logic and 
philosophical concepts, with detailed thought given to establishing with linguistic precision 
the meaning(s) of words. Alastair McGrath summarises the direction of theology under the 
Scholastics’ influence: 
The noted medieval historian Etienne Gilson has aptly described the great scholastic 
systems as ‘cathedrals of the mind’. Each scholastic system tried to embrace reality 
in its totality, dealing with matters of logic, metaphysics and theology. Everything 
was shown to have its logical place in a totally comprehensive intellectual system. 126 
McGrath also takes the view that whilst there was a tendency towards overly sophisticated 
debate the Scholastics made significant contributions to theological discourse. He writes: 
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However, scholasticism may be argued to have made major contributions in a 
number of key areas of Christian theology, especially in relation to the role of reason 
and logic in theology. The writings of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of 
Ockham –often singled out as the three most influential of all scholastic writers – 
make massive contributions to this area of theology, which served as landmarks ever 
since.127 
Gordon Clark, whose own writings seem in every sense Scholastic, identifies one of the 
benefits of “systems of theology” such as those formulated by Aquinas. He writes:  
The intellectual labours of the preceding two centuries, often brilliant, were largely 
spent on special problems. Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo is an instance, and for that 
matter so was Proslogion. But even though Augustinianism furnished a unity of 
approach no one, not even Bonaventura who came closest to doing so, succeeded in 
placing multitudinous details in their mutual logical relationships. Without an 
integrated system it is easy to “solve” two special problems from two incompatible 
principles without noticing the inconsistency; with an integrated system it is easy to 
demolish less skilful constructions. This is what Thomas did.128 
By 1350, however, Scholasticism was in decline as theological subtleties became increasingly 
central to scholastic discussions.  Separating into rival schools on the basis of minor issues 
gradually removed theological concerns away from the daily life of ordinary believers. Those 
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unsympathetic to the scholastic enterprise viewed these endeavours as nothing more than 
the study of trivial pursuits or theological and logical nit-picking.  
In the 16th century Protestant Reformation the Reformers initially, for the most part, 
rejected the scholastic emphasis with its accompanying natural theology and Aristotelian 
methodology, and sought to develop new theological paradigms.  Both Luther (1483-1546) 
and Calvin (1509-5164) laboured to provide a fairly straightforward though systematic 
presentation of Christian dogma but did so with little recourse to the Scholastic 
methodology.  Indeed the Reformation assumed an initial antipathy towards Scholasticism. 
This, however, did not last long as Herman Bavinck writes: 
Initially the Reformation assumed a hostile posture toward scholasticism and 
philosophy. But it soon changed its mind. Because it was not, nor wanted to be a 
sect, it could not do so without theology. Even Luther and Melanchthon therefore 
already resumed the use of philosophy and recognised its usefulness. Calvin 
assumed the high position from the start, saw in philosophy an “outstanding gift of 
God”, and was followed in this assessment by all Reformed theologians.129 
The circumstances that served as a catalyst for a new surge in scholastic methodology was 
the political and ecclesiastical landscape of Europe during the late 16th Century.  The 
presence of Lutheran, Catholic, and Reformed Churches inevitably required each 
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ecclesiastical body to articulate and defend whatever truths they were confessing.   This was 
done by constructing systematic representations of each faith while also attempting to 
demonstrate the internal consistency and coherence of the ideas within a sophisticated 
faith system.  In order to facilitate this task Aristotelian philosophy was once again 
employed in the attempt to place theological claims on a more solid and rational 
foundation.  
Alister McGrath identifies 4 characteristics that distinguished the new approach to theology: 
1. Human reason was assigned a major role in the exploration and defence of Christian 
theology. 
2. Christian theology was presented as a logically coherent and rational defensible system, 
derived from syllogistic deductions based upon axioms. In other words, theology began 
from first principles and proceeded to deduce its doctrines on their basis. 
3. Theology was understood to be grounded upon Aristotelian philosophy and particularly 
Aristotelian insights into the nature of method; later Reformed writers are better 
described as philosophical, rather than biblical, theologians. 
4. Theology became orientated towards metaphysical and speculative questions, especially 
relating to the nature of God, God’s will for humanity and creation, and above all the 
doctrine of predestination.130 
In the last analysis a new range of systematic theologies appeared, and this was wedded to 
a rigorous, renewed concern for method, and the establishment of first principles.   Indeed, 
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a case can be made that scholasticism was nothing other than an academic method of 
arranging theological truths in an organised and coherent way.  
Furthermore, the notion that God is not subject to laws of logic, or that human logic is 
restricted to this side of the ontological boundary that separates God and the created order, 
is held by theologians not normally sympathetic to John Hick.   Thomas Torrance appears to 
hold to this position. He writes: 
God who is infinitely greater than our words or logic has stooped down to speak with 
us in our poor creaturely words and human logic and thus give them a Truth beyond 
any power or capacity they can have in themselves.131 
And again: 
Real theological thinking is thus alive and on the move and under the control of 
Truth that makes it free from imprisonment in timeless logical connections.132 
Torrance is not alone in this conviction. Many theologians subscribe to the view that having 
given the laws of logic God himself is not subject to these laws. Indeed, the notion of the 
law of non-contradiction, for example, as possessing no necessity in the sphere of 
transcendent ontology has become commonplace. On these grounds God need not be 
defined in terms of one or many, person or thing, conscious or unconscious, purposive or 
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non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil, loving or hating. God need not conform 
to whatever logical possibilities or limitations exist this side of the ontological boundary. All 
of this finds an echo in the writings of Rene’ Descartes and other philosophers who believed 
that God’s subjection to laws of logic compromised the doctrine of His omnipotence.  
Ronald Nash summarises this for us: 
Descartes believed an omnipotent being could do absolutely anything including that 
which is self-contradictory. God’s actions are not limited by laws of logic. Descartes 
advanced this view on the conviction apparently, that the Thomist position 
dishonours God by making him subject to a law (the law of non-contradiction) that 
Descartes believed is as dependent on God as any other law. Just as God could have 
created the world so that it was governed by different laws of nature so also He 
could have subjected the world to different logical and mathematical laws. 
According to Descartes God freely decreed the logical and mathematical truths that 
obtain in our world and could have created a different world in which the principle 
of non-contradiction or propositions like “two plus two equals four” were necessarily 
false.133 
The notion of God’s omnipotence being compromised by the limitations placed upon him by 
logic is not an argument that commends itself.  Richard Swinburne for example alerts us to 
the fact that the idea of a logically impossible state of affairs should not be understood to be 
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anything at all beyond the form of words employed to describe it. He argues that those who 
suggest that a truly omnipotent being ought to be able to do the logically impossible err. He 
writes: 
A logically impossible action is thought to be an action of one kind, on a par with an 
action of another kind, the physically impossible. But it is not. A logically impossible 
action is not an action. It is what is described by a form of words which purport to 
describe an action but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose can 
be done. It is no objection to A’s omnipotence that he cannot make a square circle. 
This is because “making a square circle” does not describe anything which it is 
coherent to suppose can be done.134 
Neither does it seem that retreating into the notion of “mystery” allows us to postulate a 
being to whom none of our concepts apply. If none of our concepts apply to God, then we 
can know nothing of him and for that reason are quite unable to justify or provide any 
warrant for the claim that he transcends logic or anything else. The notion of “encounter” is 
also rendered vacuous as a means of experiencing a God who transcends our conceptual 
schemes.   
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Gordon Clark in addressing the issue states: 
This point needs some emphasis and repetition. A meeting in which no conceptual 
knowledge or intellectual content was conveyed would not give the subject any 
reason for thinking he had met God. Nor could such an inarticulate experience point 
to anything definite beyond itself. Though the experience might still be stubbornly 
called religion by those who think or better feel that emotion is the essence of 
religion it could never be identified as Christianity Judaism or Islam.135 
Carl F.H. Henry summarises well the dilemma of those such as Hick and Torrance who wish 
to set forth truths about a God who transcends our conceptual schemes. He writes: 
Torrance seems to be privy to objective propositional knowledge about God which 
his methodology pointedly disallows to other human beings. From what source, for 
example, did Torrance derive the information that “there is an ultimate objectivity 
which cannot be enclosed within the creaturely objectivities through which we 
encounter it, an objectivity that indefinitely transcends creaturely objectivities.”136 
In the last analysis the case for a God who transcends our conceptual schemes, but of whom 
something can be said, has still to be made. However the straightforward though profound 
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question that Hick and others are struggling with is quite simply; how can the mind of man 
know the mind of God?  
 
3.6 The Logos Doctrine 
In contradistinction to all theories that place God forever beyond the intellectual 
comprehension of man, the classical Logos doctrine appears to establish the grounds that 
make rational communication between the divine and human minds possible. 
Ronald Nash supports this contention in the following way: 
As we have seen, the allegation that a radical disparity exists between the 
transcendent divine mind and the finite mind of human beings is a fundamental 
postulate of the theological agnosticism that pervades much contemporary 
theology. An adequate alternative to this special position requires the development 
of an ontology and epistemology that will bridge the alleged gap. Fortunately, no 
new theory is required. The answers to this problem can be found in the Logos 
doctrine of the early church. Jesus Christ the eternal Logos of God mediates all divine 
revelation and grounds the correspondence between divine and human minds. The 
eternal Logos is a necessary condition for the communication of revealed truth; 
indeed, it is a necessary condition for human knowledge about anything. From the 
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beginning of Christianity it was believed that reason and logic have cosmic 
significance.137 
In other words, according to Nash, the Logos of God functions so as to bridge the alleged 
ontological and epistemological gap between the mind of God and the mind of man.  
The gospel according to John chapter 1 verse 1 is a significant text which introduces us to 
the idea of the Logos: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God.  
Perhaps the most tedious way to approach any investigation of the word Logos is to list the 
various dictionary meanings.  However, in attempting to do so we are confronted 
immediately by the fact that the word Λόγος can be translated by around 40 different 
English words, while some lexicons have more than 5 columns, each 90 lines long. The many 
meanings listed include: reason, reckoning, computation, ratio, speech, oracle, explanation, 
wisdom, sentence, argument, principle and law.  In the light of the fact that we are faced 
with making some sort of choice between long lists of possible meanings, a more fruitful 
route of enquiry would be that of seeking to establish the actual usage of the word and the 
meaning of the idea as it is found in  Greek philosophical and Hebrew literature. However, 
on the other hand the word Logos as applied to Christ is very rare in the New Testament and 
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it is hazardous to read into it the various meanings it had in Philo and the Greek 
philosophers.  
It may be worth noting that the present trend within contemporary scholarship seems to be 
to interpret the concept of the Logos by viewing it within an Old Testament Hebrew setting, 
rather than a Greek one. The primary reason for this is that the phrases, “ The Word of God” 
and, “The Word of The Lord”, are employed throughout the Old Testament in such as a way 
as to confer upon the phrases something of an independent existence and personification. 
James D.G. Dunn comments in this regard that most scholars: 
… would agree that the principal background against which the Logos prologue must 
be set is the Old Testament itself, and the thought of inter-testamental Hellenistic 
Judaism, particularly expressed in the Wisdom literature. 138 
George Eldon Ladd unpacks the idea in the following way: 
In the Old Testament, the word is not merely an utterance; it is a semi-hypostatized 
existence so that it can go forth and accomplish the divine purpose. (Isa.55v10-11). 
The word of God uttered at creation, expressed through the mouth of the prophets 
(cf. Jer. 1 v4, 11 ; 2v1) and in the law (Ps 119 v 38, 41, 105), has a number of 
functions that may well be attributed to the Logos in John. The concept of 
personified wisdom also provides Jewish background for the Logos concept. In 
Proverbs 8 v 22-31, wisdom is semi-hypostatized. Wisdom was the first of all created 
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things and at the creation of the world “I was beside him like a master workman 
“(Proverbs 8 v 30). Wisdom comes forth from God to dwell in Israel to make them 
God’s people.139 
Within Greek thought the idea of Logos can be reliably traced back to the philosopher and 
Greek scholar Heraclitus who lived during the 6th century B.C. and in whose thought the 
word was something of a technical term. As a philosopher Heraclitus taught that all things 
were in a state of flux or change and that the basic structure or nature of the universe 
consisted of 3 principal elements, these being, fire, earth and water, of which fire was the 
primary element. However, in the midst of this flux there is one constant fixed pattern 
which in turn functions as the explanatory principle of the universe, and this Heraclitus 
called ‘the Logos’. However the word is translated, it represents a fixed truth that remains 
the same or a supreme intelligence that rules the universe thus making the universe an 
ordered whole. In practical terms the logos provided the link between rational discourse 
and the world’s rational structure. 
The Stoic philosophers whose school was organised about 300 B.C. took the thought of 
Heraclitus and further developed it. For the Stoics the Logos was the active, unifying rational 
principle of the universe and the source of all that existed. The whole universe was 
conceived as forming a single living whole that was permeated by a power understood to be 
fire which in turn reveals itself as a powerful energy that lies behind and gives form to the 
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unformed universe. This energy manifests itself through innumerable seminal logoi or 
formative forces that energise all of nature and life. These seminal logoi either control or 
actually are each living thing, including man who lives in accordance with the same 
principle. Viewed within the world of religious thought it would not be inaccurate to 
describe the world view of Heraclitus and the Stoics as pantheistic.                                                                                                                                                           
The Logos doctrine gained new impetus under the influence and thought of Philo of 
Alexandria who lived from about 25 B.C. until about A.D. 50. Alexandria had been founded 
by Alexander the Great and for nearly three centuries a Jewish Diaspora had flourished in 
the city due to the fact that Alexander had established the city upon principles of religious 
liberty.  A Jew by birth and upbringing, Philo is principally remembered for his philosophical 
treatment of the Scriptures. Philo, influenced both by Hellenic thought and the Old 
Testament, made use of the Logos term as a highly significant component in his theological 
scheme that fused together aspects of Greek and Judaic thought into Hellenistic Judaism. 
The overall aim of Philo seems to have been to demonstrate that the philosophical and 
religious enquiries of the Greek philosophers are actually to be realised in and through the 
God of Abraham.  Within this scheme the Logos was employed as the concept which 
functioned as a vehicle or means of mediation between the transcendent God and the 
creation.  
Philo’s attempt to synthesise Greek philosophy and the world of Hebrew thought was aided 
considerably by several associated ideas that he took for granted: 
Gordon Clark explains: 
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The possibility of Philo’s combining Hebrew revelation with pagan philosophy 
depends on a complex of factors, which, if they seem strange today were taken as 
normal and good sense then. First, the Bible presumably does not contain all truth, 
and therefore it is possible that Plato and Aristotle may have discovered some. 
Second so admirable is Plato’s general viewpoint and so often in accord with 
Scripture that one should not rule out the possibility that somehow or another he 
had received information from Moses. Then, third, Philo believed that the Scriptures 
should be interpreted allegorically, with the result that, an indefinite latitude was 
permitted within which many philosophic themes might be found.140 
Philo’s allegorical interpretations placed upon the Hebrew Scriptures seem today to be 
somewhat fanciful but of greater interest is his theory of ideas and the terminology he 
employs in connection with this. It is in connection with the theory of ideas that Philo 
speaks of the Logos whom he calls the Son of God. Like Plato, Philo distinguished between 
the material world and the ideal world of eternal forms but unlike Plato he represented the 
world of ideas as ideas in the mind of God.   
This world of ideas he called the Logos, and as Gordon Clark suggests the: 
Logos passes from a stage internal in the mind of God to a stage external as a really 
existing world of ideas, and even to a third stage in which he becomes immanent in 
the sensible world.141 
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Ronald Nash expands: 
The forms are created in the sensible world in the sense that God is a necessary 
condition for their existence. If God did not exist the forms would not exist.  Since 
the forms subsist in the mind of God they are ontologically dependent on God for 
their existence. But since God is eternal and the Forms are His eternal ideas the 
Forms are also eternal. They are the eternal thoughts of God which serve as an 
archetypal pattern for the corporeal world.142 
There is little doubt that the title of the Logos as Son of God gave his theory of the Logos 
some standing before early Christian thinkers, who also accepted the method of allegorical 
interpretation employed by Philo. 
However it is widely recognised that Philo’s use of Son of God cannot be pressed into the 
service of Christian theology simply by means of this terminological analogy.   
Once again Gordon Clark explains: 
Such a Christian Interpretation of Philo cannot be successfully maintained. It 
depends too greatly on Philo’s highly figurative language. Obviously Philo personifies 
the Logos but this personification is entirely metaphorical. Philo says that Laughter is 
a son of God. God is the husband of wisdom, Wisdom is the daughter of God, 
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Wisdom is the mother of the Logos, and, even Wisdom is the father of instruction. 
Such metaphors cancel each other out. Philo’s sober position is that for 
epistemological and cosmological reasons there must exist a world of ideas, but 
contrary to Plato God must be supreme.143 
The use of the word Logos in Philo has of course given rise to the question of a possible 
relationship between Alexandrian Judaism, and the writer of the fourth gospel.  However it 
is clear that while Philo wrote about the Logos in personal terms this was not conceived in 
terms of an historical person.  Philo’s personification of the Logos was nothing more than a 
metaphysical abstraction, whereas John’s gospel speaks of the Logos as an historical and 
unique individual.  Indeed James Dunn takes the view that John was the first to identify the 
word of God as a particular person and the first Christian writer to conceive clearly of the 
personal pre-existence of the Logos-Son and to present it as a fundamental part of his 
message.144 
In Philo the office of the Logos does not go beyond the divine facts of the creation and 
preservation of the world and is not placed in any relationship to the Messiah and the 
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Messianic Kingdom. Moreover, unlike Philo who viewed matter as evil John’s Logos came in 
a bodily form. 
Gordon Clark, commenting on the Logos in bodily form, writes: 
This culminating idea, the great idea which differentiates the Christian Logos 
doctrine from every other philosophy as well as from the semi-Jewish Philonic 
doctrine is the incarnation of the Word, the Reason, or the Wisdom of God. The 
Logos became flesh. So utterly contradictory and even repulsive to all Greek 
speculation is this that one is astounded to read reputed scholars who characterise 
John as Hellenistic and dependent upon Gnostic, Stoic and Platonic sources.145 
In other words despite verbal similarities and thematic links with either Greek or Old 
Testament thought John breaks new ground completely when, he sets forth  unique 
features of the personified logos. John Chapter 1 v 18 provides us with the prologue: 
John’s prologue unpacks five distinct characteristics of Jesus as the logos of God and it is it is 
the theological significance of such that John intends us to focus our thoughts upon.  
The first meaning attached to the theology of Jesus as the logos of God is the pre-existence 
of Jesus.  John Chapter 1: 1 declares that Jesus was in the beginning. Such language directs 
our thoughts to eternity prior to creation and the existence of the logos as the agent of 
                                                          
145
 Gordon H. Clark, The Johannine Logos, 32. 
 
 
116 
 
creation. John chapter 1: 1-2 follows with a second claim that Jesus in divine. The logos, was 
with God but also was God. This seems to express the twin notion that Jesus was deity but 
not fully exhaustive of deity.  John’s meaning may be said to imply that everything the logos 
is, God is, but also that the logos has an exclusive identity and that God is more than the 
Word.  
It should be noted that the pre-existence of Christ is a theme developed within the writings 
of Paul. First Corinthians 8:6 and Colossians 1:15-20 would seem very clearly to envisage 
some sort of pre-existence attributed to Jesus. According to James D.G. Dunn146 the view 
that commands unanimity of agreement among New Testament scholars is the one that 
understands these passages to be drawing upon earlier Jewish reflection upon divine 
Wisdom, which is now embodied in Christ. 
John chapter 1:3 sets forth the logos not as the ultimate source of creation but rather the 
agency or mediator through whom God as the ultimate source created the All that exists. It 
ought to be clear at this point that John is not sourcing his ideas from Greek thought, for the 
simple reason that the notion of a fiat creation was present only in Hebrew thought, and 
this as Genesis describes. 
John chapter 1:14 exclaims that the logos partook of human nature and dwelt among us.  
This statement, very much like the previous claim to fiat creation, provides a solid refutation 
of the notion that John borrowed from Greek thought. The Greek dualism that separated 
God from the world would be quite at variance with the incarnation of deity as John 
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declares. The truth that John is at pains to impress upon the reader is that it was God 
himself in the logos who entered into space-time and history, taking upon himself all that 
was essential to our human nature. Throughout the gospel records Jesus is described as 
experiencing a comprehensive range of human experiences such as love, compassion, 
weariness, thirst, sorrow, zeal and anger.  He exhibits human need such as food, drink and 
sleep.  
The fifth claim John makes is that the Logos functions as one who enlightens and reveals 
such issues as the truth, grace, glory and God himself. 
Bringing all these statements together we may say with Herman Bavinck: 
Jesus is the Logos and in an utterly unique sense: revealer and revelation at the same 
time. All the revelations and words of God in nature and history, in creation and re-
creation, both in the Old and New Testament, have their ground unity and centre in 
him.  He is the sun; the individual words of God are his rays. The word of God in 
nature, in Israel, in the NT, in Scripture may never even for a moment be separated 
and abstracted from him. God’s revelation exists only because he is the logos. He is 
the first principle of cognition in a general sense of all knowledge, in a special sense, 
as the logos incarnate, of all knowledge of God, of religion and of theology.147 
In keeping with the thought of Bavinck, the New Testament ascribes three functions to the 
Christian Logos.  As such we discover that Christ is spoken of in terms of a cosmological, an 
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epistemological and a soteriological function.  All this is to say that Jesus as logos is the 
necessary condition for the existence of the world, for all human knowledge and for 
salvation and redemption.  
What makes intelligent communication from God to those created in his image possible, 
according to the logos teaching, is that man – as one who is created in God’s image – also 
has the same rational structure inherent in his person. In other words, there is a 
correspondence between man and God at the level of rational thought and linguistic 
expression.  
It ought to be clear, therefore, that according to a logos Christology human knowledge is 
possible by virtue of our relationship to the eternal logos of God, Jesus Christ.  This is so 
because mankind is created in the image of God, and this image makes possible rational 
communication and revelation between God and man. It stands to reason that if such 
rational communication is to be meaningful, then God must structure his acts of 
communication in accordance with the same laws of logic that human thought conforms to, 
and to which language gives expression.  
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Chapter 4: God’s Self-Disclosure 
In rejecting the Logos doctrine as historically formulated by Christian theologians, on the 
grounds that a radical disparity exists between the transcendent divine mind and the finite 
mind, John Hick nonetheless understood that the felt presence and awareness of the divine-
transcendent provided sufficient grounds for establishing a genuine communication 
between the divine and the human.   Indeed, for John Hick the felt presence and awareness 
of the divine transcendent was an essential family trait in the world family of religious 
devotees.  It is this awareness of God that is sufficient to invite an uncompelled response of 
worship.  
In this respect Hick’s notion of God’s self-disclosure, or revelation, as mediated in this way 
would, at least on the surface, appear to be not too dissimilar to the traditional view of what 
Christian theologians have labelled ‘General Revelation’. 
 
4.1 Biblical General Revelation 
The notion of a God consciousness, mediated through nature, and corresponding to an 
innate religious awareness, has indeed enjoyed a place within the history of Christian 
thought. Herman Bavinck writes: 
120 
 
This general revelation has at all times been unanimously accepted and defended in 
Christian theology. It was particularly upheld and highly valued by Reformed 
theologians.148 
General or Natural Revelation is best understood as God’s self-disclosure and self-
communication in the cosmos and the created world.  
James Packer explains the idea: 
The Bible records the words that God has spoken in history about his work of 
redemption in history. But one of the things which the Bible reveals is that God also 
reveals Himself apart from the Bible and in a way not dependent upon the revelation 
of his saving purpose. The latter revelation was given through a particular sequence 
of events, to particular men at particular times in particular places; but this other 
form of revelation is given everywhere and at all times, to all men, through the 
ordinary experience of being alive in God’s world.  It is given through all created 
things… because this revelation is conveyed through the ordinary course of the 
created order it is called ‘natural’ in contrast with the ‘supernatural’ revelation given 
through God’s particular redemptive utterances in history.  Because it is universally 
given it is called ‘general’ in contrast with ‘special’ revelation recorded in the Bible 
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which comes only to those who read or hear God’s word and which never reaches 
many men.  149 
General Revelation also is considered to be a manifestation of God’s Common Grace. As 
Donald Macleod states: 
The primary instrument of common grace is God’s general revelation.150 
There is, therefore, an objective revelation provided in and through the created order, 
which is correlative to a God-consciousness within our human psychology, which in turn is 
explained in terms of man being created in the image of God. Calvin writes: 
That there exists in the human minds and indeed by natural instinct, some sense of 
Deity, we hold to be beyond dispute, since God himself, to prevent any man from 
pretending ignorance, has endued all men with some idea of his Godhead, the 
memory of which he constantly renews and occasionally enlarges, that all to a man 
being aware that there is a God, and that he is their Maker, may be condemned by 
their own conscience when they neither worship him nor consecrate their lives to his 
service.  151 
Calvin understands this sense of divinity or seed of religion as an implanted, intuitive and 
indelible awareness of the existence of God which is present in every person.  This is part 
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and parcel of the psychological makeup of mankind, as created in the image of God.   It is 
important to recognise that for Calvin this is not a revelation that is restricted to any one 
particular class or group of people, but rather is available to all people, whether they be 
Christian, Muslim or Buddhist.  There is then a general revelation of God that is universally 
available to all people and is experienced by all people, yet this revelation is distinct in 
mode, content and function from what is termed special revelation.  
Calvin identifies three consequences of this inbuilt consciousness of the existence of God: 
(a) the universality of religious impulse; (b) a sense of guilt in the conscience; and (c) a 
servile fear of God.  
Objectively, before mankind stands the created order, which is characterised by perspicuity 
and is revelatory in character. All people by observing the universe around them function as, 
and experience themselves to be, interpreters of this general revelation. In the very act of 
observing the created order, the necessary idea of the existence of God is triggered.   
However, while it is true that the idea of general revelation is fundamental to Christianity, 
there has existed some debate about the mode of this general revelation.  Is this general 
revelation through which we experience a knowledge or awareness of God immediate, or 
mediate? 
William P. Alston lists three distinct sorts of experience that fit with the notion of 
apprehending God: 
A. Absolute immediacy. One is aware of X but not through anything else, for 
example, a state of consciousness. 
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B. Mediated immediacy (direct perception). One is aware of X through a state of 
consciousness that is distinguishable from X, and can be made an object of 
absolutely immediate awareness, but is not perceived. 
C. Mediated perception. One is aware of X through the awareness of another object 
of perception.152 
In favour of a mediated and a posterior perception R.C. Sproul writes: 
Mediated natural knowledge involves human reflection on the creation. The invisible 
things of God are known by means of the visible things.  In Romans 1:20, Paul is 
affirming that humans can in fact move from the phenomenal realm to the 
noumenal realm making the dispute with Kant all the more vivid. The method of 
knowing here is not the immediate apprehension of the inner being of God. The 
knowledge is mediate or inferential, indicating the rational power to deduce the 
necessary existence of the invisible from the perception of the visible.153 
Thus the argument speaks in favour of, a knowledge of God through inferential reasoning. 
Other theologians understand this apprehension of God as resultant upon a form of a-priori 
immediate apprehension.  Greg Bahnsen writes: 
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Even without a discursive argument or a chain of inferences from elementary 
observations about experience all men see and recognise the signature of the 
creator in the world that he created and controls.154 
What Bahnsen and others have in mind is the presence of an immediate apprehension that 
is analogous to the way a person recognises a relative or close friend when he or she comes 
within view. 
In one sense the tension between the two can be resolved if we accept that   the speed of 
one’s inferential reasoning in this case may be so rapid and spontaneous that it is 
experienced as if no process of thought is involved at all. However, what is common to both 
is that there is a sense of deity in the human heart that is correlative to the revelation of 
God in and through the created order, and this revelation is of such a nature that one can 
reliably infer or intuitively recognise the existence of God.  
 
 
4.2 Pluralistic General Revelation 
John Hick understands the presence of a revelation from God which is mediated through the 
natural order, and with which the human mind engages by means of what he calls 
‘interpretation’. This interpretation in turn takes two forms, namely explanation and 
recognition.  In the first instance we may speak of interpretation as explanation, as when we 
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are engaged, for example, in literary analysis of a novel by Dickens or Conrad or some other 
writer. Interpretation as recognition involves an immediate act of apprehending something 
that is presented to us and takes the form of a primary and intuitive response to the created 
order.   
It is interpretation as recognition that Hick takes to be fundamental to the appropriation of 
knowledge.  Religious faith is therefore understood as interpretation resultant upon an 
awareness of God mediated through nature.  
Hick’s representation appears to bear similarities to the Christian notion of general 
revelation, insofar as it is universally available to all mankind and involves a human 
awareness of, and freely chosen felt response to, divinity by means of interpretation. He 
states: 
The broad hypothesis which I am suggesting, then, is that the Infinite Spirit presses in 
all the time upon the multiplicity of finite human spirits and yet always so that our 
finite awareness of this encompassing reality is filtered through a set of human 
religious concepts and spiritual practices.155 
Despite these apparent similarities there are a number of ways in which Hick’s proposal is 
radically different from the Christian notion of general revelation. 
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Consider Hick’s view of the universe. According to the pluralistic hypothesis the universe is 
ambiguous and for this reason allows for a multiplicity of equally valid interpretations. He 
writes: 
By religious ambiguity of the universe I do not mean that it has no definite character 
but that it is capable from our present human vantage point of being thought and 
experienced in both religious and naturalistic ways.156 
And again: 
It seems then that the universe maintains its inscrutable ambiguity. In some 
respects, it invites whilst in others it repels a religious response. It permits both a 
religious and naturalistic faith but is(?)haunted in each case by a contrary possibility 
that can never be exorcised. Any realistic defence of the rationality of religious 
conviction must therefore start from this situation of systematic ambiguity. 157 
While holding to the ambiguous nature of the universe Hick nonetheless defends the 
rationality of religious belief allied to a religious interpretation of the universe.  That is to 
say that the believer is within his/her epistemic rights to take a religious view of the 
universe and is fully warranted in doing so.  
He states: 
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Those who participate in the realm of religious experience are, as rational people, 
fully entitled to trust it.158 
Thus Hick’s epistemological scheme holds together the nature of the universe as ambiguous 
yet the status of faith as a fully warranted and valid interpretation. For this reason, the 
religious person is within his/her epistemic rights to view the universe in this way.  
However, in contrast to Hick, Christian theologians such as Calvin understand general 
revelation to be unambiguous and pre-interpreted. Secondly, although the believer is indeed 
fully warranted in holding to a belief in God, Calvin and others speak of the obligation to 
believe and not simply the rationality of belief. Conversely to disbelieve in the face of 
general revelation is to engage in not only an irrational but ultimately an unethical act. For 
this reason, the person who interprets the universe in a non-religious way is not within 
her/his epistemic rights in doing so. John Frame represents this view when writing: 
Is it ever rational, either in the “situated sense” or in the “objective” sense, to 
disbelieve in God’s existence or irrational to believe in it? Obviously not, in the 
objective sense, granted that God exists. In the situated sense the question 
becomes: is anyone ever in a situation where he lacks a ground for believing that 
God exists? I would say no on the basis of Romans 1, which teaches that all persons 
not only have grounds for believing in God (epistemic permission if you will) but that 
all actually know him at some level of consciousness.159 
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Commenting upon Romans Chapter 1 18:21 Greg Bahnsen writes: 
In the first place we observe that Paul says that men do actually in some sense see 
the truth. We do not do justice to this passage by merely saying that all men or most 
men believe in God or believe that God probably exists. Paul says that the revelation 
of the only existing God is so clearly imprinted upon man himself and upon his 
environment that no matter how hard he tries he cannot suppress this fact. As 
psychologically active self-conscious creatures they must see something of the truth. 
They hold down the truth to be sure but it is the truth they hold down. Nor is it that 
this truth is objectively placed before them only in nature and in the make-up of 
man. It is to be sure on this that Paul does lay this emphasis. But knowledge is also in 
man in the sense that his subjective reaction to that which he sees shows some 
acquaintance with the truth. The invisible things are perceived (kathoratai). Knowing 
God (gnontes ton theon) they have not glorified God.160 
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Chapter 5: God’s Universal Influence 
5.1 God’s Spirit at Work in All Religions? 
Given the presence of (a) Logos Christology, (b) General Revelation, and (c) the activity of 
God’s Spirit in the world, the question must now be asked as to the relationship of this to 
the world of religious experience beyond the Christian Faith. Clearly it is not just the 
Christian who falls within the scope of God’s universal care. 
John Hick’s response to this question  is to locate the evidence of God’s Spirit at work in all 
religions through (a) the presence at times of comparable levels of morality in world religion 
when contrasted with that evidenced by the followers of Christ, (b) the presence at times of 
demonstrably lower levels of morality in the followers of Christ , when contrasted with the 
lives of other religious devotees (3) the presence of a common religious experience with 
which the life of faith begins, evidenced in the fundamental common soteriological feature 
of turning away from self to God and our fellow man.  
 
5.2 Comparable Levels of Morality 
In respect of Hick’s first point i.e. the presence at times of comparable levels of morality in 
world religions when contrasted with that evidenced by the followers of Christ, it must be 
stressed that the Christian position is not one that denies the presence of moral qualities 
and virtues within the lives of non-Christians, nor that the Spirit of God is active only within 
the Christian Community.  According to Christian theology there is such a divine activity, 
understood as Common Grace, which is efficacious, revelatory, and benevolent but not 
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soteriological.  Almost all standard Reformed systematic theologies include a section 
unpacking the notion of common grace. This is a term theologians use to describe the 
benevolence of God, to all mankind universally. John Frame sums up the challenge posed by 
Hick’s response when he concedes: 
But for our present purposes, the main point to notice is that some of the blessings of 
common grace look very much like the blessings of salvation itself.161 
The doctrine has been formulated both negatively and positively in response to the very 
issues that seem to vex John Hick.  
Common grace can be defined as: 
God’s universal non-saving grace, in which blessings are given to humanity for 
physical sustenance, pleasure, learning, beauty etc, as expressions of God’s 
goodness. It is particularly contrasted in Reformed theology with God’s special or 
saving grace.162 
Donald Macleod provides a helpful summation of the matter in following statement: 
Alongside the doctrine of redemptive grace, Reformed theology also developed the 
doctrine of common grace.  This was intended to account especially for three factors 
in the human situation. First, the blessings enjoyed by the reprobate. The sun shines 
on them, the rain falls, their harvests are plentiful and their prosperity often exceeds 
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that of the righteous. Secondly, the laudable qualities to be found in the lives of 
those who are totally alienated from God. They are often exemplary citizens, 
courageous patriots, wise and affectionate parents. Their lives are usually decent, 
and sometimes heroic. Thirdly, the cultural achievements of the natural man. He has 
toiled with conspicuous success in the fields of art, literature, music, philosophy, 
politics, medicine, engineering and indeed in every area of human endeavour. 163 
John Calvin, attributing such qualities or virtues in the life on the non-Christian to the Holy 
Spirit, states: 
We ought not to forget that those most excellent benefits of the divine Spirit, which 
he distributes to whomever he wills, for the common good of mankind. The 
understanding and knowledge of Bezalel and Oholiab needed to construct the 
Tabernacle, had to be instilled in them by the Spirit of God (Ex.31:2-11; 35:30-35). It 
is no wonder, then, that the knowledge of all that is most excellent in the human life 
is said to be instilled in them by the Spirit of God.164 
Sinclair Ferguson highlights the tendency at times to confuse God’s common grace with his 
special grace:  
In this connection a common hermeneutical principle is often employed, which 
involves identification and universalizability: what is stated to be true of a particular 
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individual in Scripture is assumed to be true of the whole of humanity mutatis 
mutandis... this assumes too much. It is appropriate to believe, with Calvin and many 
others that all truth is God’s truth, even when it is found in the mouth of the 
ungodly, and that all good gifts come to us from above (Jas.1:17). Yet it is quite 
another thing to assume that this is an evidence of the Spirit’s saving or transforming 
presence.165 
 
5.3 Demonstrably Low levels of Morality 
In relation to Hick’s second point i.e. the presence at times of demonstrably lower levels of 
morality in the followers of Christ, when contrasted with the lives of other religious 
devotees, a formal rebuttal frequently offered by Christian apologists is one that attempts 
to draw a distinction between the truth-claims of Christianity and the moral qualities of 
those making the claims. In short, just as the truth of a proposition does not depend on the 
ethics of the one asserting it, so it is argued that the truth-claims of Christianity are not 
confirmed or disconfirmed by the values or moral standards upheld, and modelled, by the 
religious devotees who confess and proclaim these truths.  In short, a logical fallacy lies at 
the heart of Hick’s rebuttal which confuses the confessional aspect of the Christian 
community with the relational and ethical standards of the community.  But while the 
logical form of this argument may be sound, the theology is much weaker.  Hick is, in fact, 
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on solid ground when he insists that the Bible does not allow for such a bifurcation within 
Christian spirituality.  
Richard B. Hays comments: 
The fruit of God’s love is the creation of communities that confess, worship, and pray 
together in a way that glorifies God.  Those who are baptized, Paul insists, have 
become “one in Christ Jesus”, no longer divided by former distinctions of ethnicity, 
social status, or gender (Gal.3:28). Because in Christ they are all “sons of God” they 
all belong together in a single family in which all are joint heirs. His passionate 
opposition to Cephas in Antioch (Gal. 2 11-22) sprang from his urgent conviction that 
Jews and Gentiles must be one in Christ, not separated by social barriers.166 
Again, Richard B. Hays writes: 
Thus “community” is not merely a concept; as the term is used here, it points to the 
concrete social manifestation of the people of God.”167 
The attempted rebuttal of Hick’s criticism simply misses the point altogether. The truth 
proclaimed by the Christian Church is set forth within the Bible as the truth embodied and 
modelled in the life of the Christian Church. Logically there may be a distinction between 
the two but theologically no such bifurcation is envisaged within the Bible. Indeed, as 
Donald Macleod points out the doctrine of the Trinity, for example, is itself set forth as a 
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model for the nature of the Christian Community both at the confessional and relational 
level,168 
Is it possible, then, to concede to the legitimacy of Hick’s observation that the professing 
Church has been found wanting at times, without concurring wholeheartedly with his 
conclusion, i.e. that this phenomenon renders null and void the claim of the Church to stand 
in an exclusive soteriological relationship to the Holy Spirit?  
Perhaps the first criticism of Hick is that he advances the notion of self-ascription. That is to 
say he is willing to regard as Christian any group, movement, or body that claims to be so.  
However, the Bible itself does not advance self-ascription as an authenticating test of faith 
but rather asserts the requirement of a credible profession of faith evidenced in an 
appropriate orthodoxy and orthopraxis.   
Secondly, he promotes the somewhat discredited concept of Christian Nations as a valid 
category.  The notion that modern European States of the twentieth century can be equated 
in some sense with, for example, the Byzantine Empire, or that King Leopold II of Belgium 
served as a representative of the Christian faith  as he governed the Congo, requires a great 
deal more analysis and scrutiny than Hick is prepared to offer.  Precisely to what extent 
were the European nations Christian? Was the Second World War, really a theatre of 
conflict between representatives of the Christian Faith in any meaningful sense?  These 
sorts of questions require careful and painstaking analysis both at an historical and 
theological level of enquiry. Sweeping generalizations that equate Europe with the Church 
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are unlikely to yield much in the way of meaningful answers to the sort of questions Hick is 
addressing.   
Thirdly, Hick seems not to allow for the possibility of corruption within ecclesiastical bodies.  
Certainly during the Middle-Ages there existed a fusion of ideology, politics and Church, and 
this at a time when the presence of the Church was ubiquitous throughout Europe and its 
influence powerful and persuasive. The Reformation movements themselves were in large 
measure a reaction against the corruption of the institutional Church.  Given such a complex 
set of circumstances, it would be incumbent upon any scholar of religious history to engage 
in painstaking analysis, and this at many levels, before pronouncing that this or that 
grouping could be considered authentic spokespeople for the Christian Church. According to 
Jesus, the salt can lose its saltiness, and indeed frequently did so, from Genesis to the 
Churches in Revelation.  
Alister McGrath commenting upon this very point states: 
There is however another point which must be made. I make it with a degree of 
sadness and reluctance. At least some of what passes as Christianity is a pathetic 
distortion of the real thing. Nominal Christianity – a form of Christianity which 
retains its outward beliefs, while its life force has been spent – is among the worst 
enemies of the Christian apologist. The spiritual and moral deadness which often 
lingers around such forms of Christianity can be deeply oppressing, and can cause 
the most negative associations to arise in the minds of individuals.169 
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However, the fundamental answer to this dilemma posed by Hick lies in the fact that he has 
embraced a somewhat idealistic notion of Christian spirituality.  The dynamics of Christian 
spirituality do not assert that every Christian will be at every stage of his/ her life 
demonstrably more virtuous than the best of their neighbours.   
The Christian claim is a modest but profound one, and is articulated well by Alister McGrath. 
He writes:  
Christian believers and the Christian Church continue to sin, and fall short of what 
God intends for them. The real test is whether Christianity makes a difference – 
whether the ‘after’ is superior to the ‘before’.  170 
John Hick seems to envisage that the Christian upon profession of faith has conferred upon 
him or her, as if by magic, a Christ-like character replete with the complete range of moral 
virtues consistent with the fruit of the Spirit of God. However, the claim made by the 
Christian is not that sin or frailty has been eradicated by the grace of God, but rather that a 
process of change has begun in conformity to the blueprint of God for righteous living.  Thus 
a person whose character, prior to becoming a Christian, has been shaped by life-long 
addictions, anti-social behaviour, destructive habits, cripplingly low self-esteem or sexual 
abuse, may not seem any better at all in comparison to his neighbour whose worldview is 
Buddhist, and who has been raised in a more wholesome social and family context.  John 
Hick may well perceive that the Buddhist devotee is displaying greater levels of self-control 
while exercising higher levels of social virtue in his interaction within the community.  His 
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parenting skills may be more advanced, his sensitivity to the law may be heightened, and his 
organization and stewardship of his finances may display levels of thrift quite absent in the 
life of the Christian.  The change envisaged by the teaching of Jesus, though, is not one that 
gives birth to a superhero, who emerges from the act of regeneration as a replica of Christ, 
but rather one that gives birth to a person who remains frail and sinful, yet in whose life the 
after is superior to the before.  This process of change for the most part will be recognised 
by those who know that person best, and such a change must be  measured against the 
unique backdrop of the individual’s previous life and worldview. Thus a person keeping his 
appointments faithfully while paying his or her rent consistently, after years of proving 
themselves untrustworthy and unreliable, is a testimony to God’s transformative grace.  
However, to those who do not know this person, he or she may seem less of a model citizen 
than the devout Muslim who has been an upstanding member of the community all his 
days. 
  
5.4 The Presence of a Common Religious Experience 
As to Hick’s third point, namely, the presence of a common religious experience with which 
the life of faith begins and which is evidenced in the fundamental common soteriological 
feature of turning away from self to God and to our fellow man, it may well appear that this 
was adumbrated in the Old Testament, where God is spoken of as influencing and directing 
the actions of individuals who are otherwise not known for their allegiance to the God of 
Israel.   
Isaiah 45:1, for example, speaks of Cyrus being caught up in God’s redemptive purposes:  
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"This is what the LORD says to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I take hold of 
to subdue nations before him and to strip kings of their armour, to open doors 
before him so that gates will not be shut”. 
It is also set forth in the New Testament. In John Chapter 1:9 we read of the logos as the 
true light, which gives light to everyone, coming into the world.  
Given that the Logos has epistemological, soteriological and cosmological functions we must 
ask if it is permissible  to speak of the soteriological function as one  exclusively expressed in 
terms of Christian religious experience or can we speak  of the Christian religious experience 
as simply fuller in kind but not greater in respect of salvation than other religious 
experiences? This question was one that John Hick wrestled with as others had done before 
him.  
Justin Martyr, for example, writes as follows: 
It is unreasonable to argue, in refutation of our doctrines, that we assert Christ to 
have been born a hundred and fifty years ago, under Cyrenius, and to have given his 
teaching somewhat later, under Pontius Pilate; and to accuse us of implying that all 
men born before that time were not accountable. To refute this, I will dispose of the 
difficulty by anticipation. We are taught that Christ is the First- born of God, and we 
have explained above that he is the Word (reason) of whom all mankind have a 
share, and those who lived according to reason are Christians, even though they 
were classed as atheists.  For example among Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus; 
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among non-Greeks, Abraham, Ananias, Azarias and Misael and Elias and many 
others.171 
In citing Justin Martyr in this way it is possible to view him not as a pluralist but as a 
proponent of accessibilism.  Terrance L. Tiessen defines accessibilism in the following way: 
Accessibilism asserts that Jesus Christ is exclusively the way of salvation and that the 
covenantal relationships God established with Israel and the Church in working out 
his saving program are unique and unparalleled. Accessibilists believe, however, that 
there is biblical reason to be hopeful (not simply agnostic) about the possibility of 
salvation for those who do not hear the gospel. So they do not restrict God’s saving 
work to the boundaries of the Church as ecclesiocenterists do. 172 
Tiessen’s assertion is that this is not a new idea but one that can be located in the thought 
of major theologians of every era of Church history and theological tradition. Thus he cites 
Zwingli and Luther as well as the Puritan Richard Baxter alongside many others. This of 
course is not the same thing as Hick’s pluralism but is a concession that the Logos of God is 
at work in a soteriological way within the life of those outside of the Church and out with 
the sound of the gospel.  
John Hick clearly understands the divine logos to be functioning in a broad and unitary way.  
He writes: 
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If the divine Logos is indeed at work and has always been at work in this way 
throughout the life of mankind we may expect great developments in the various 
religious traditions in this new age in which we are increasingly interacting with one 
another.173 
And again: 
If we define salvation as actual human change, a gradual transformation from 
natural self-centeredness (with all the human evils that flow from this) to a radically 
new orientation centred in God and manifested in the “fruit of the Spirit” then it 
seems clear that salvation is taking place within all of the world religions-and taking 
place so far as we can tell to more or less the same extent.174 
Herman Bavinck addresses the relationship of the Logos and General Revelation to the 
world at large in Volume One of his Reformed Dogmatics.  
He writes: 
It was not long before Christian theology, instructed by Holy Scripture, made an 
important distinction in the matter of revelation. On the one hand the connections 
and agreement between the religion of the Christians and the religion of the pagans, 
between theology and philosophy, could not be completely denied. On the other 
hand Christianity certainly was a unique and independent religion essentially 
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different from the pagans. In the face of this tension early Christian theologians were 
led to make a distinction between “natural” revelation (religion, theology) and 
“supernatural” revelation. 175 
Bavinck interprets the non-supernatural revelation, nonetheless, as an illumination by the 
Logos, and writes in the following manner: 
Among pagans, says Scripture, there is a revelation of God, an illumination by the 
Logos, a working of God’s Spirit (Gen. 6:17; 7:15; Ps.33:6; 104: 30; Job 32:8; 
Eccles.3:19; Prov. 8: 22; Mal.1:11-14; John1:9; Rom.2:14; Gal.4:1-3; Acts 14:16, 17; 
17:22-30).  Many church fathers (Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and others), 
assumed an operation of the Logos in the pagan world. Although Augustine 
repeatedly spoke very unfavourably about pagans, he nevertheless recognised that 
they saw adumbrations of the truth, that the truth was not wholly concealed from 
them, and, accordingly that we must take advantage of the truth elements in pagan 
philosophy and appropriate it. Still, since God’s image has not been so completely 
erased from the soul of man by the stain of earthly affections, as to have left 
remaining there the merest lineaments of it , whence it might be justly said that 
man, even in the ungodliness of his life, does or appreciates some things contained 
in the law. Also many impure peoples recognise much that is true. 176 
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Addressing the issue of common grace Bavinck recognised that while the operation of 
common grace was understood by the Reformers to be present and influential in relation to 
various aspects of human culture, this did not extend to the teaching and practices of non-
Christian religions.  At this level common grace was restricted to the notion of innate and 
acquired religion as expressed in the formula of Calvin.  Thus these religions were traced to 
deception and demonic influences.  
Bavinck takes a different view of things in this regard, seeing Christianity as the fulfilment of 
all that is best in world religion. He writes: 
However, an operation of God’s Spirit and of his common grace is discernible not 
only in science and art, morality and law but also in religions. Calvin rightly spoke of 
“a seed of religion,” a “sense of divinity”.  Founders of religion, after all, were not 
impostors or agents of Satan but men who, being religiously inclined, had to fulfil a 
mission to their time and people and often exerted a beneficial influence on the life 
of peoples. The various religions, however mixed with error they may have been, to 
some extent met people’s religious needs, and brought consolation amidst the pain 
and sorrow of life. 177 
Donald Macleod expands on this in the following way: 
The belief that Jesus Christ is universal Lord and the only Saviour does not imply that 
Christianity has a monopoly of truth. It shares many of its values (for example, love 
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of one’s neighbour, concern for the poor and belief in the sanctity of life) with other 
world faiths. It also shares with some of those faiths a significant body of theological 
belief.178 
As established previously John Hick stretches this overlap in religious awareness to one of 
religious experience with which the life lived in response to God begins. 
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Chapter 6: The Distinctive Character of Christian Regeneration 
6.1 Regeneration Defined 
The inception of spiritual life, according to which one is made alive to God by the Spirit, has 
come to be known within Christian theology as the doctrine and experience of 
‘regeneration’.  Despite the importance of regeneration to Christian spirituality, it is 
doubtful whether the early church had any theological comprehension of the complexities 
involved in the concept of regeneration. 
In the first period of church history, through the preaching of the gospel, spiritual rebirth 
was a reality that people experienced. However, at this stage there seemed little need to 
engage in any further or deeper analysis concerning the precise workings of God’s Spirit in 
bringing about the experience of new birth.   
As Herman Bavinck observes: 
Rebirth was an event that they had lived through in their own souls, but the moment 
they began to think and write about it, the explanation was inadequate. As a rule, 
people confined themselves in their theoretical reflections to the demands of the 
gospel, faith and repentance but did not push through to the inner hidden workings 
of the Spirit that lay behind them.179 
 Louis Berkhof takes a similar view when he states: 
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In the mind of the early Church the term “regeneration” did not stand for a sharply 
defined concept. It was used to denote a change closely connected with the washing 
away of sins, and no clear distinction was made between regeneration and 
justification.180 
Indeed, in the history of theology the unpacking and exposition of the various elements 
contained within soteriology, e.g. regeneration, justification and sanctification, had to wait 
until other more pressing questions, such as those related to the person and work of Christ, 
had been clarified.  
As Sinclair Ferguson comments:  
Only in the discussions of the Middle-Ages and the Reformation Period were more 
definitive statements on soteriology sought and provided.181 
A working definition of regeneration is given by Wayne Grudem who writes: 
We may define regeneration as follows: Regeneration is a secret act of God in which 
he imparts new spiritual life to us. 182 
Michael Barrett writes similarly: 
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The component of the gospel that concerns the inception of spiritual life is 
regeneration. Regeneration refers to the implantation of the principle of spiritual life 
in the heart of the sinner resulting in an instantaneous, radical and obvious change 
of nature affecting the whole governing disposition of life. 183 
Regeneration is thus the ontological and existential condition necessary for all further 
spiritual transformation in the Christian life. Irrespective of what other differences exist 
within the broad Christian Church this doctrine is a core component of Christian 
spirituality.184 
In the context of our study, the theology of regeneration occupies a place of great 
importance, and that for the following reason:  John Hick has attempted to identify a 
common and universal religious experience by peeling away what he understands to be the 
doctrinal element within religion from its experiential core, before describing the latter in 
phenomenological terms.  It is, according to Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, this 
phenomenological description that provides us with the universal and common 
denominator of all religious experience.   
The question that must be asked, therefore, is: to what extent, if any, can biblical 
regeneration – when described in phenomenological terms – be harmonised with Hick’s 
description of this universal religious experience?  
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6.2 Regeneration and Religious Experience 
Hick outlines his understanding of the operation of the Spirit in the following way: 
The broad hypothesis which I am suggesting, then, is that the Infinite Spirit presses in 
all the time upon the multiplicity of finite human spirits and yet always so that our 
finite awareness of this encompassing reality is filtered through a set of human 
religious concepts and spiritual practices.185 
According to Hick, this activity of the Infinite Spirit causes a person to be conscious of 
something (God) outside of oneself, and such awareness takes as its object the 
Transcendent or The Real, although there is no direct contact with the Real at any time.  
Thus when viewed phenomenologically, religious experience for Hick begins with (a) an 
awareness of the Real as that which is ultimate, and (b) a life-changing response evoked by 
that experience.  
Within Hick’s hypothesis our finite response to the Infinite Spirit is filtered through a set of 
human religious concepts and spiritual practices.  Such theological formulations, therefore, 
are not part of the transcendent experience, but already exist as social, cultural and 
religious constructs, which in turn are brought to bear as interpretive frameworks upon 
one’s transcendent experience.   
It must be said that such bifurcation of Christian spirituality in the way that Hick suggests 
finds little support within the history of ecumenical and mainstream Christian theology. 
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Even within those Christian traditions grounded in a cataphatic and contemplative 
spirituality, there is recognition that we cannot separate truth experienced from truth 
confessed.  
Vladimir Lossky commenting upon this writes: 
The term ‘mystical theology’ denotes no more than a spirituality which expresses a 
doctrinal attitude... The Eastern tradition has never made a sharp distinction 
between mysticism and theology, between personal experience of the divine 
mysteries and the dogmas affirmed by the church... Far from being mutually 
opposed, theology and mysticism support and complete each other... Mysticism is 
the perfecting and crown of all theology: as theology par excellence.186 
Moreover at the level of a theistic worldview it is not immediately obvious how much of this 
biblical, religious and interpretive structure could have come into being in the first place.  
For example, what factors could possibly have given rise to the idea of the Trinity, or 
salvation through a God-man’s death on the cross, or again the concept of linear time 
embraced within the tiny nation of Israel, throughout a period of ancient history when other 
religious cultures viewed time as cyclical? 187 
The main objection, however, to Hick’s thesis in the context of pneumatology is that the 
Christian experience of regeneration described in phenomenological terms cannot be 
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harmonised with the experience of the Spirit as set forth by Hick within his pluralistic 
scheme.  The primary reason for this is that what Hick insists are detachable constructs, and 
therefore not part of the essence of the experience, are in fact, for the Christian, very much 
part of the experience itself.   In other words, any phenomenological description of Christian 
experience must contain within it aspects of the experience such as, for example, an 
awareness of God’s holiness, a conviction of sin and moral wrongdoing, and the self-
understanding that follows.  These features are not, as Hick suggests, extraneous to and 
detachable from the Christian experience, but are fully part of it.  
Paul Helm states: 
The elements of Christian conversion are not simply a collection of feelings or 
experiences, or religious sensations, but they are elements set within a framework of 
understanding and belief about God, the person himself and the world around him.  
This fact about the character of Christian experience is one of the reasons why it is 
impossible to think of the various major religions of the world – Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism and so forth – as agreeing in a common core of religious experience and 
differing only in the different interpretations which each has built around this 
common foundation. For it is not that the religious experience of the Buddhist, is the 
same as that of the Christian, as two identical suits might be wrapped in different 
coloured wrapping paper. 188 
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In an identical way Muhammad’s testimony, for example, to receiving the words of the 
Koran in the cave of Hira forms part of his religious experience, and is not some sort of 
doctrinal component that can be removed from the experience, when such is described 
phenomenologically. Certainly the various components of Muhammad’s revelation can be 
analysed separately, but they cannot be separated existentially within his experience.  Now, 
as Keith Yandell points out189 precisely the same problem is encountered when analysing the 
phenomenological shape and content of enlightenment experiences of other faiths.  Thus an 
enlightenment experience in Advaita Vendata is described as being identical to a quality-less 
Brahman.  In Jainism one enters into an existential independence or ontological security 
alongside being omniscient and in Theravada Buddhism we are composed at any given time 
of momentary elements and over time of bundles of such elements.   Now the question is 
not whether these phenomenological features can actually be true of any given experience 
but simply that this is how these religious devotees describe the experience of which they 
are aware.  Thus the notion that one can experientially separate the subconscious elements 
of an enlightenment experience from the conscious manifestations of that experience 
(represented in the vocabulary describing it) is not consistent with how the phenomenology 
of religion is experienced, conceptualised and described by those to whom such an 
experience has come.   
Hick may well concede that phenomenologically these experiences of the enlightened life 
and the Christian experience of spiritual rebirth are different yet insist at the same time 
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these are but two forms of regeneration with very important features in common. For 
example, each hinges upon a radical shift from self-centredness to a new orientation 
centred in the Ultimate which evidences itself in a common moral and spiritual outlook. The 
Buddhist is filled with compassion and the Christian with love. These in practice seem quite 
indistinguishable. However, the problem is that the fruit of the awakened character as 
described here is not necessarily religious in any shape or form, but may well be manifest in 
the life of the non-religious person. As such this cannot be taken then as evidence of a 
religious experience.  Moreover, the experience of the various religious devotees is more 
complicated that Hick’s reductionist instincts would suggest.  All religions in the world give 
rise to alternative and contradictory metaphysical systems. Indeed there are only a limited 
number of mutually exclusive ways to view the world and it is these worldviews that emerge 
from within the religious faith of the worshipper. Thus, Theism and the Panentheism seem 
quite incompatible with Pantheism and Polytheism.  How can such systems of thought 
emerge from within a common core religious or spiritual experience?  
 
6.3 Regeneration and the Spirit of God 
A similar objection can be raised against the insistence by Hick that the work of the Spirit 
must conform to his own representation of it. The Christian’s experience of the Spirit of God 
is on the same footing as his or her experience of regeneration, i.e. something capable of 
being described, represented and indeed tested for authenticity. The link between the 
influence of the Spirit and the experience of regeneration is understood within Christian 
spirituality to be two sides of the one coin. 
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Within the New Testament the chief expositor of regeneration through the Spirit is the 
Apostle John and the locus classicus on the topic is John Chapter 3 v 3-8, in which the 
teaching of Jesus on the matter is recorded: 
Commenting upon this Sinclair Ferguson observes:  
While the term ‘regeneration’ is not strictly associated with the work of the Holy 
Spirit in the New Testament, the idea of inauguration into the Kingdom of God as 
Spirit-wrought new birth is widespread and in fact is foundational in Johannine 
theology… Being ‘born of God ‘(i.e. through the Spirit) becomes a characteristic 
description of being a Christian in Johannine theology.190 
Louis Berkhof further emphasises the monergistic nature of regeneration when he writes: 
The only adequate view is that of the Church of all ages, that the Holy Spirit is the 
efficient cause of regeneration. This means that the Holy Spirit works directly on the 
heart of man and changes its spiritual condition. There is no co-operation of the 
sinner in this work whatsoever. It is the work of the Holy Spirit directly and 
exclusively, Ezek.11:19; John 1:13; Acts 16; Rom.9:16; Phil.2:13. Regeneration, then, 
is to be conceived monergistically. God alone works, and the sinner has no part in it 
whatsoever. 191 
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As we move to the writings of the Apostle Paul it becomes clear that the experience of the 
Spirit is not something divorced from his understanding of the Spirit. 
James Dunn comments:  
 Paul did not turn away from the thought of the Spirit as the experienced Spirit. It 
was too fundamental to his own and his churches’ spirituality. The existential reality 
of ‘receiving the spirit’ was too central to his understanding of the crucial transition 
to Christian discipleship. But he was farsighted (or experienced) enough to hedge the 
experiential dimension around with critical tests and to insist on Christ and the 
remembered character of Christ as the fundamental norm by which all claims to 
experience the Spirit should be measured.192 
In fact, far from setting forth the Spirit of God in vague generalised terms, Paul’s theology 
evidenced a clarity concerning: (a) the identify, and (b) the ministry of the Spirit of God that 
had been absent prior to the New Testament era. 
James D. G. Dunn picks up on this point, informing us that Paul provides a redefinition, or 
tighter definition, of the Spirit as the Spirit of Christ:  
This in fact constitutes one of Paul’s most important contributions to biblical 
theology, or to any theology which looks to the Scriptures of Jew and Christian for its 
framework. For in speaking of the Spirit as the Spirit of Christ, Paul was reflecting 
theologically on what had been hitherto an ill-defined and vague conceptuality of 
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the Spirit – ill-defined and vague precisely because it embraced or lay behind a wide 
range of experience and existential phenomena. Paul’s definition, therefore, gave 
the conception of the Spirit the sharpness and clarity it had been lacking. The point is 
worth some emphasis. Paul did not speak of the Spirit uncritically in relation to all 
experiences of himself or his converts. On the contrary “the Spirit of Christ” became 
in effect a critical conceptual tool which enabled him to evaluate experiences and to 
distinguish one experience from another. Only those experiences were to be 
recognised and welcomed which manifested the Spirit as the Spirit of Christ. 193 
Throughout the New Testament the experience of spirit-wrought regeneration is 
understood to be authenticated by the changes that are effected in the life of the 
regenerated person. In other words, contrary to the modus operandi of the Spirit set forth in 
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, the Christian community’s experience of the Spirit’s 
soteriological workings in regeneration is conceptualised in such a way as to make any 
separation of the rebirth experience from the life that follows it quite impossible.  
John Murray articulates the position well when he writes: 
The causal priority of regeneration to any saving activity on our part does not mean 
that the regenerate person may still live in sin and be unconverted. The passages in 1 
John make this perfectly clear for not only does John emphasise in these passages 
the logical and causal priority of regeneration, but also, and perhaps more overtly, 
the invariable concomitance of regeneration on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
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doing of righteousness (2:29), and the loving of our fellow men and knowing God 
(4:7), the not sinning and the inability to sin (3:19; 5:19), believing that Jesus is the 
Christ (5:1), willing subjection to the commandments of God and overcoming the 
world (5:4). It is quite impossible to think of regeneration as existing in abstraction 
from this catalogue of virtues, and this is the equivalent of saying that these virtues 
must coexist with and accompany regeneration. That is to say that regeneration 
cannot be conceived of apart from the new life which it begets.194 
 Murray further states: 
We do find, however, in Paul that the new birth in the priority of its conception as a 
creative act of God, is indissolubly related to the broader notion of renewal, 
including at least the earlier and probably later stages of conscious regeneration on 
the part of the renewed person.195 
It ought to be pointed out, however, that the fuller understanding of the person and work of 
the Spirit as revealed in the New Testament was in large measure adumbrated and indeed 
fully anticipated in the Old Testament. Indeed, within the Old Testament we are introduced 
to the projected blessings of the promised Messianic salvation, framed precisely in terms of 
regeneration. 
 John Murray writes: 
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As Dr Warfield says, ‘The re-creative activity of the Spirit of God is made the 
crowning Messianic blessing (Isa. 32:15, 34:16, 44:3, 59:21; Ezek. 11:19, 18:31, 
36:27, 27:14, Zech. 12:10); and this is as much to say that the promised Messianic 
salvation included in it provision for the renewal of men’s hearts as well as for the 
expiation of their guilt’.  There can be no doubt that the Old Testament in prophecy 
testifies to regeneration as one crowning blessing, if not the crowning blessing, of 
salvation on its subjective side as it was to be realised in the Messianic age.196 
Within the writings of Paul the central functional role of the Spirit of God is that of uniting 
us to Christ through regeneration, and it  is this theological paradigm of being ‘in Christ’ 
which dominates Paul’s exposition of the Christian life. Theologically the significance of the 
term ‘in Christ’ lies, for Paul, in the parallel phrase, ‘in Adam’. The latter communicates the 
idea that whatever Adam did he did so representatively, therefore one’s standing before 
God is determined by Adam’s actions. Conversely, whatever Christ did he did so 
representatively, and therefore all the saving benefits of his work accrue to those who are 
united to him. Sinclair Ferguson comments: 
The dominant motif and architectonic principle of the order of salvation should 
therefore be union with Christ in the Spirit.197 
This expression of ‘union with Christ’ and its variants are used by Paul around 160 times.  In 
2nd Corinthians 12:2 and Romans 16:7 the words are used as virtual synonyms for ‘Christian’.  
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It is only by our being in ‘union with Christ’, and this ‘through the Spirit’, that we receive the 
multiple blessings associated with salvation. Moreover, these salvific benefits accrue to the 
believer exclusively, immediately and simultaneously. There is also an eschatological 
dimension to the work of the Spirit, because all aspects of salvation have yet to be 
consummated, although all are in principle already the possession of the believer.  
James D. G. Dunn suggests that the motif can be analysed under three broad categories. 
These are not rigidly distinct, but in differing contexts blend into one another. He writes:  
First there is the more objective usage, referring particularly to the redemptive act 
which happened ‘in Christ’ or depends on what Christ is yet to do. Second there is a 
more subjective usage where Paul speaks regularly of believers being ‘in Christ’ or ‘in 
the Lord’.  Third, both ‘in Christ’ and ‘in the Lord’ phrases occur where Paul has in 
view his own activity or is exhorting his readers to adopt a particular attitude or 
course of action. 198 
In the light of the above, it ought to be clear that the experience of regeneration effected by 
the Spirit and with which the Christian life begins, is an irreducibly complex one that cannot 
be equated with, or subsumed into, the more generic religious experience set forth by Hick. 
The specific Christological structure inherent within the Christian experience of God may be 
analysed systematically, but not separated existentially, in the experience of the believer. In 
short, the Buddhist, Islamic and Hindu religious experience is quite distinct from the 
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Christian religious experience, and indeed within those faith communities is understood to 
be so.  
 
6.4 Regeneration and the Principle of Credulity 
In the light of this phenomenological description and theological interpretation of Christian 
regeneration, all in the context of the Spirit’s work, John Hick finds himself caught in the 
horns of an epistemological dilemma.  Within his discussions on warranted belief Hick 
established with some skill that religious experience should be trusted as a source of 
knowledge, by citing the principle of credulity, which states that a person’s claim to perceive 
or experience something is prima facie justified, unless there are compelling reasons to the 
contrary.  The principle of credulity is thus the assertion based on observation that our 
experience is normally reliable, and that if we experience X then this experience provides 
evidence that X exists. He writes: 
It is a basic principle of life that we trust and act upon our experience except where 
we have reason to distrust it.199 
Having cited the ‘principle of credulity’ as foundational to the believer’s claim that his or her 
belief in God is rational and warranted, he is now compelled, in the interests of his 
pluralistic hypothesis, to deny to the believer the same principle in respect of the structure 
and content of the experience that has given rise to the belief in the first instance.  
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According to Christian testimony this particular experience with which the Christian life 
begins, admits of a very specific structure and content. The structure of the experience is 
described as ‘subject/consciousness/object’ and the content is set forth under the 
aforementioned theology of regeneration.  There may, of course, be additional experiences 
of which biblical spirituality admits (Isaiah in the temple, Moses in the wilderness, Saul on 
the Damascus Road), but whatever their differences these are all understood to conform to 
the same structure of ‘subject/consciousness/object’.  
Keith E. Yandell unpacks the idea:  
The relevant experiences are subject/consciousness/object in structure; they involve 
a person having an experience which, providing that the experience is reliable, 
involves being aware of something or someone that is not dependent for its 
existence on being experienced. In that respect such experiences resemble 
experiences of shrubs and worms (these being typically reliable, and shrubs and 
worms existing independently of one’s experiencing them)... They are also 
experiences in which the at least apparent object is not oneself, one’s body or one’s 
mental states; they are (if reliable) experiences of something other than oneself or 
one’s body or one’s states – a being that exists distinct from and independent of 
oneself. 200 
Hick is happy to accept the reality of such experiences; the reality of a transcendent 
dimension to the experiences; but not the varying   phenomenological descriptions of these 
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experiences. Given, however, that these are existentially inseparable from one another and 
both supported by his principle of credulity this seems rather strange.  
In the light of the above one has to have certain uneasiness about Hick’s own claim to a 
special immunity from the very epistemological relativism that he insists everyone else is 
subject to. In short Hick demands that his own theology of world religion be taken as 
objectively true but that all others be denied that possibility.  
Daniel Clendenin writes in this regard: 
The absolutist character and confidence of pluralism can hold true only if it assumes 
a neutral, Archimedean position above and beyond all space and time, but this is 
precisely what pluralism claims is impossible. Methodologically the pluralist vantage 
point is no more neutral, detached or objective, nor any less universal-absolutistic 
than exclusivism. Only the content is different. And notice the content! The entire 
pluralist project belies its ostensibly modest epistemology. One would be hard 
pushed to proffer a more deliberate attempt at a trans-historico-cultural- absolute 
meta-theory, a more grandiose and sweeping interpretation of all religious doctrine 
and experience of all peoples times and cultures.  201 
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6.5 The Relationship of the Spirit to the World System 
A final point germane to the subject is the fact that within the New Testament itself the 
Spirit of God is represented as one who stands unequivocally in an antithetical relationship 
to the world system and not in a conciliatory relationship.   
John’s Gospel chapter 16:8-11 informs us that the Spirit convicts the world: 
And when he comes, he will convict the world concerning sin and righteousness and 
judgment: 9 concerning sin, because they do not believe in me; 10 concerning 
righteousness, because I go to the Father, and you will see me no 
longer; 11 concerning judgment, because the ruler of this world is judged. 
John’s Gospel chapter 14:16-17 informs us that the world system cannot know the Spirit: 
 16 And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Helper, to be with you 
forever, 17 even the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it 
neither sees him nor knows him. 
First Corinthians chapter 2:12-14 informs us of the antithetical relationship between the 
Spirit of God and the spirit of the world: 
12 Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, 
that we might understand the things freely given us by God. 13 And we impart this in 
words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual 
truths to those who are spiritual. 14 The natural person does not accept the things of 
the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them 
because they are spiritually discerned.  
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And again in the First Epistle of John chapter 4:2-3 the point is made: 
2 By this you know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has 
come in the flesh is from God, 3 and every spirit that does not confess Jesus is not 
from God. This is the spirit of the antichrist, which you heard was coming and now is 
in the world already.  
John Chapter 15:26 sets forth this testimony of the Spirit to Jesus in the following way: 
But when the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of 
truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness about me. 
Within the culture of the gospel narratives, persons at court were not represented by highly 
qualified solicitors. Instead a judge adjudicated. 202 The function of a witness was that of 
testifying to the character of the accused. Only someone who had an intimate knowledge of 
the accused and could testify to his integrity was in a position to provide such a testimony. 
Insofar as the Holy Spirit’s presence with and influence upon Jesus extended from his 
conception to his resurrection then he is supremely qualified to serve as the witness-
advocate to his person and work.   Clearly when the Bible sets forth the identity and 
ministry of the Holy Spirit it does so within a theological and interpretive framework that 
gives understanding and intelligibility to what is taking place.  This same principle is true of 
all aspects of Christian religious experience and it is in the light of this that it is proper to 
speak of Christian exclusivism without conceding the pejorative or emotive associations that 
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John Hick attaches to the notion.   As previously stated this, of course, is not to say that one 
cannot discover truth about God outside of Christianity. 
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Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks 
7.1 The Corpus of Hick’s Writings 
Like the work of most innovative scholars, Professor Hick’s writings have served as a catalyst 
for much discussion, and indeed span some forty years. The extent to which the corpus of  
his writings should be treated as a unified and coherent whole, has been something of a 
contentious issue among commentators.  Some commentators hostile to the impression 
(conveyed by Hick himself) that his earlier and later theological and philosophical views can 
be harmonised into a single system, have insisted that the theology within his writings 
betrays an underlying discontinuity. Others take the view that Hick’s theological journey to 
pluralism reflects a development in his theological thinking, although the word development 
can be understood in several ways.  However, perhaps we do more justice to Hick by 
viewing him not as a theologian in any one tradition but essentially as a philosopher whose, 
epistemology (originally considered within a Christian theological framework) remained 
largely consistent throughout his career, even as he moved beyond the theological 
framework of Christianity. 
 
7.2 Hick’s Defence of the Pluralistic Hypothesis 
Hick represented his pluralistic hypothesis as the best, and the most comprehensive and 
economical explanation of the facts of the history, viewed from a religious point of view.  
However he disliked the idea of his hypothesis being subject to criticism by those who 
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offered no alternative explanation and suggested that the only right response was to proffer 
another hypothesis.  
Keith E. Yandell, responding to Hick’s assertion writes: 
I reject this notion of what “the right” response is. If I propose that the reason why 
our friend is putting cherry pies into the dishwasher is that she thinks the pies are 
prime numbers, you do not have to offer another hypothesis in order to show that 
my explanation will not work. Prime numbers are things you can move around.203 
 
7.3 Hick’s Engagement with Christian Theology  
The pluralistic hypothesis of Professor Hick also required that he become something of an 
expert in an enormous amount of religious and theological literature, as well as in several 
ancient and modern languages. Understandably, it was difficult for him to keep abreast of 
developments in all the varied fields of enquiry that impinged directly or indirectly upon his 
research. He believed that theologians lacked philosophical training but Hick had his own 
Achilles’ heel. Commenting upon his engagement with evangelical Christianity, the branch 
of the Christian faith Hick claimed to know from inside his own experience, Alister McGrath 
writes: 
I think Professor Hick is falling victim to the tendency to caricature, perhaps through 
a lack of familiarity with the enormous growth in serious evangelical academic 
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writing since 1980... At any rate I found his criticism of evangelicalism at this central 
and crucial point to be tired, uninformed and weary, and I wondered exactly whom 
he was criticising. 204 
He remained puzzled as to why the Christian faith in its exclusive form continued to be 
embraced by a wide range of academic philosophers, while his predictions of the demise of 
the Christian faith in the face of modern scientific enquiry as yet seems quite unfulfilled.  
Indeed, the Christian faith, even in its most simplistic form, continues to advance 
throughout the non-Western world and, this at a rate unparalleled in human history, while 
the Bible, is in constant demand with new versions and translations being produced at a 
prodigious rate.  
He was somewhat disillusioned that the trend within Christian theological scholarship 
moved in the direction of inclusivism or accessibilism which merely distinguished between 
the ontological necessity of the work of Christ, and the epistemological necessity of hearing 
about and responding to it in an explicitly cognitive manner. This for Hick was something of 
a halfway house which conceded very little to his thesis. On the other hand if we are to 
measure his influence by the volume of discussion generated about the future hope of 
those who live without recourse to the Gospel message, then it is immense. Not only has 
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Hick served as a catalyst in this regard but the recent field of enquiry has ranged from 
discussions on eschatology, to patristic theology, in an endeavour to explore the key issues 
raised in his writings.  
Throughout his writings Hick seems to view the religious devotee who makes an absolute 
truth claim concerning his/her faith one who is lacking in humility. In other words one 
cannot hold one’s belief with humility but can only do so in the absence humility.  This 
charge was not of course one that was peculiar to Hick. Wilfred Cantwell Smith consistently 
spoke of what he regarded as the moral consequences of the traditional doctrinal teaching 
of the Church with regard to those outside of the Faith. Namely that it led to, and was 
fuelled by, an attitude of arrogance and was ipso facto un-Christian. 
Thus he writes concerning the exclusivist salvific claims of the Church. 
Let us leave aside for the moment any question of whether or not it is true. We shall 
return to that presently. My point here is simply that, in any case, it is arrogant. At 
least it becomes arrogant when one carries it out into the non-Western world.205 
However as statistical research has demonstrated206consistently over the last 40 years, 
Christianity is in fact no longer rooted in the Western world but has relocated its centre to 
the non-Western world among the indigenous populations of the continent of Asia.  Clearly 
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the millions of converts to Christianity in Asia would not be happy to have their faith set 
forth in terms of Hick’s pluralistic philosophy. Indeed the pluralistic philosophy imposed 
upon such indigenous faith and belief seems itself not too dissimilar to the western cultural 
arrogance he seemed to dislike so much. 
 
7.4 Hick’s Contribution to Religious Epistemology 
Professor Hick’s promotion of “warrant” grounded in “religious experience” as providing 
sufficient “grounds for faith” was something of a new departure in religious epistemology, 
and continues to be developed in these days. Had he chosen to stay within this narrower 
field of enquiry he would doubtless have occupied an extremely prestigious place in the 
field of epistemology.   
 
7.5 Hick’s Critique of Christian History 
Professor Hick’s contribution to Christianity also lay in his drawing attention to the 
demonstrable gulf that at times has existed between the truth confessed, and the truth 
modelled, by the Christian community, and this particularly in the western world. The 
unfortunate historical association of the Church with institutions of oppression, wedded to 
the absence of meaningful identification with the poor and marginalised, has contributed to 
the picture of a Church uncritically and theologically tied to the establishment.  Admittedly, 
his criticisms were at times weakened by his tendency to broad generalizations. However, 
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Hick’s voice, perhaps somewhat prophetic in this regard, was, and remains, one that must 
be listened to.  
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